Community Standards Enforcement Report Press Call

March 1, 2022
11:15 a.m. ET

Operator: Please continue to stand by, your conference will begin momentarily. We thank you for your patience.

Hello, and welcome to today’s community standards enforcement report press call. There will be prepared remarks and a Q&A to follow. To ask a question after the prepared remarks conclude, please press the “1,” “4” on your telephone. As a reminder, this call is being recorded.

Now I’d like to turn the call over to Carolyn Glanville who will kick this off. Please go ahead.

Carolyn Glanville: Thank you so much, and thank you, everyone, for joining. You should have received Embargo materials ahead of this call with our Community Standards Enforcement Report, Widely Viewed Content Report, and the Oversight Board Quarterly Report.

To kick off our call today you’ll hear from President Global Affairs Nick Clegg with an update on our efforts related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Following that Vice President of Integrity Guy Rosen, and Vice President of Content Policy Monika Bickert, will speak on our Q4 2021 Community Standards Enforcement Report.

We will then open the call up for questions. We are on the record and this call is embargoed until 9:30 am Pacific. With that, I’ll kick it over to Nick to first talk about our efforts related to the invasion of Ukraine.

Nick Clegg: Thank you, Carolyn, and thank you, everyone, for joining this call. We are here, of course, to share the findings of our latest Community Standards Enforcement Report.

But I want to start by saying on my behalf, on the behalf of the Meta team on this call, and everyone at the company that, of course, our thoughts are with the people of Ukraine at this time. At the heart of every war are people, and
as military clashes, and political rhetoric come to bottleneck the news the devastation wrought on the lives of ordinary people can be overlooked.

But throughout the last few days, we’ve seen glimpses of the people whose lives have been turned upside down by the conflict. The heartbreak of families separated, the anxiety of people huddled on subway platforms, and the bravery and defiance of Ukrainians young and old defending their communities.

And we’ve been able to catch these glimpses in large part because especially in times of crisis people turn to social media to make their voices heard, to protest, to organize, and to share what’s happening with their communities in the wider world.

And it has been humbling to witness ordinary Ukrainians and Russians using our platforms to shine a light on what’s happening. We’ve also seen how powerful a tool social media has been for President Zelenskyy to speak directly to people around the world, including appealing to Russian people in their own language in an effort to stop the war.

And social media allows people from outside Ukraine to reach out to those inside the country. 10 percent of people in Europe, and 4 percent globally now have a Facebook friend in Ukraine. We’ve seen a huge outpouring of generosity and solidarity all over the world.

So far people have raised more than $50 million in the last five days on Facebook and Instagram alone to support humanitarian efforts. And more than 8 million people have added the Ukrainian flag frame to their profile picture on Facebook. Since the war began people are using Facebook groups to help those in need.

For instance, a Polish group of over 300,000 members are offering those impacted to be picked up at the border along with housing, clothing, and mediation. A group of Romanian volunteers and donors has over 200,000 members offering and coordinating transportation, and accommodation for refugees.

And groups across Europe are formed to offer care and housing for pets of anyone in Ukraine. Over the past several days our priority has been to ensure that people are able to continue using our apps and services safely and securely.

We want to prevent the abuse of our platforms by tackling information – misinformation, and other violating content. And taking down malicious
networks of accounts that engage in what we call coordinated inauthentic behavior. Our priorities throughout are three-fold.

First, we continue to work to make sure our services are available for people in the middle of this crisis. That is why we think it’s important to make sure our services operate in Russia despite the Russian government’s attempts to throttle our services.

Prominent Russian creators and influencers, activists, and musicians are using Facebook and Instagram to access information and speak out against the invasion. We want them to continue – to continue to be able to do so, and we want people in Russia to continue to be able to hear from President Zelenskyy, and others in Ukraine.

We’ve rolled out safety features for our users in Ukraine and Russia to help protect them from being targeted. Including the ability for people to lock their Facebook profile removing the ability to view and search friends lists with more tools on messenger.

We’ve made encrypted one-to-one chats available on Instagram for all adults in Ukraine and Russia. We’ll also show notifications for top of people’s direct message inboxes to let them know they can switch to an encrypted conversation if they want to. And then the encrypted chat already available, of course, as an option on messenger and by default on WhatsApp.

Second, we’re a company, not a government. So we are working closely with governments and responding to their requests to combat disinformation, and harmful propaganda.

We’ve established a special operations center staffed by experts from across the company including native Russian and Ukrainian speakers who are monitoring the platform around the clock allowing us to respond to issues in real-time.

At the request of the government of Ukraine and of governments in the European Union we have restricted access to Russia today in Sputnik, in Ukraine and the E.U. We have also expanded our third-party (inaudible) and capacity in Russian and Ukrainian and are providing more context and transparency around the content shared by the Russian state controlled media outlets prohibiting ads from the Russian state media and demonetizing their accounts.

I can also confirm we are demoting content from Facebook pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state controlled media outlets. And we are making them harder to find across our platforms.
We have also begun to demote posts that contain links to Russian state controlled media websites on Facebook.

Over the next few days we will label these links and provide more information to people before they share them or click on them to let them know that they lead to state controlled media websites. We plan on putting similar measures in place on Instagram.

These are just some of the measures we’ve taken over the last few days. You can find a more exhausted list in our newsroom which we aim to keep updated regularly as things move on. Events are of course fast moving and our teams remain on high alert to respond quickly and decisively.

The events of recent days gives even greater (resonance) to the report we’re here to discuss today. We have been publishing these community standards enforcement reports regularly since May 2018 both to demonstrate the seriousness with which we take protecting against abuses of our platforms and the need to tackle hate speech and other content that violates our rules. And to be transparent the progress we’re making.

But however much progress we make there will always remain more to be done to improve our systems and respond to challenges that are constantly evolving.

And with that I’ll hand over to Guy.

Guy Rosen: Thank you, Nick. Hi, everyone. I’m Guy Rosen, I’m VP of Integrity here at Meta leading the products and engineering teams that work on safety and security.

And so today we are – we’re publishing our quarterly community standards enforcement report. Today’s report covers the fourth quarter of 2021 and it provides metrics on how we enforce our policies from October through December of last year across Facebook and Instagram.

To build on what Nick just said there, we’ve made a lot of progress but even with it there will always be examples of things we miss and with the scale of our enforcement there will be examples of things we take down by mistake. There is no perfect in this kind of work.

We believe that progress on these efforts should be evaluated through this report which tracks the same metrics we operate on internally measuring progress on keeping prevalence of violating content down while minimizing the stakes on the content that we remove.
Our report today covers 14 policy areas on Facebook, 12 on Instagram and it’s our quarterly touchstone to keep you updated on our work in this space. We’re also releasing the third edition of the widely viewed content report today which provides an overview of the most widely viewed content on Facebook Newsfeed. And we’re publishing the oversight board quarterly update. Both of them also covering Q4 of 2021.

Let’s first talk about this quarter’s community standard enforcement report. Since we started reporting on prevalence across most of our policy areas we have seen stable or declining prevalence. This trend continues in this Q4 report with prevalence either remaining consistent or decreasing in almost all the policy areas that we are reporting on.

This means that the vast majority of the content that people see on our platforms is not in violation of our policies. For example, hate speech prevalence on Facebook decreased for four quarters in a row and remained consistent over the last quarter, slightly lower than Q3, coming in at 0.02 percent to 0.03 percent.

Now, in addition to prevalence, an important focus area in our work is our efforts to improve accuracy, prevent mistakes, give people ways to tell us when we get things wrong. And in some areas we may see content action numbers decrease as we improve the accuracy of our systems.

Another way we do this is by improving the transparency that people have into the actions we take. We had a page called accounts status on Facebook for awhile where people can see content that we removed and why and they can tell us if they think we got it wrong.

Last fall we launched the same account status tool on Instagram as well and we know this kind of transparency is really important because it helps people better understand our policies and it helps our systems by giving us indications when we've gotten things wrong.

And we can see this reflected in today’s report with some of the restored numbers up on Instagram across several policy areas. This kind of feedback look is a really important part of how we improve our systems to meet people's expectations.

Finally, a quick update on the independent assessment that we've been undergoing. In 2020, folks may remember we committed to an audit so that people can verify the accuracy of the metrics that we share in these reports.
As you know, we selected E.Y. to conduct this assessment. It will cover the Community Standard Enforcement Report metrics from the fourth quarter of 2021 is the report that we're sharing today and we expect the results of this process to be shared in the coming months.

With that, I'll turn it over to Monika.

Monika Bickert: Thanks, Guy. And hello, everyone. And thanks for joining us today.

I'm Monika Bickert, our VP of content policy at Meta. I lead the team that writes our policies on what content is and is not allowed on our platforms. This is an international team that works every day in partnership with local experts and organizations to identify how we can best manage our policies to keep up with new shifts in global dynamics.

Today, I want to cover four things. First, a change in our bullying and harassment enforcement. Then to policy enforcement transparency updates. And finally, our latest oversight board update.

So, first on the enforcement piece, last quarter we reported for the first time on the prevalence of bullying and harassment. This quarter we saw a reduction in prevalence in that area, bullying and harassment content on Facebook.

This reduction can be attributed largely to a change in our enforcement that makes exceptions for content that uses words that could be offensive in some context, but uses those words instead as a term of endearment or as a joking way between friends.

This change is designed to stop us from removing content where there's no actual harassment, but rather expressions of empathy, friendship or love.

This week we've also updated the misinformation section to our community standards by consolidating all the different aspects of our misinfo policy into one location. So, none of our substantive policies have changed, this new section is just taking our existing policies, putting them in one place so that they're easier to access and easier to understand in context.

And I would note, also, that this is in part a response to the oversight board's advice that we do so. You can find that new section in our community standards by visiting transparency.fc.com.

Next up, I want to highlight that starting this May, Meta will begin participating in Lumen, an independent research project that's hosted by Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center For Internet & Society. This project enables
researchers to study content tax down requests from governments and private actors concerning online content.

Now as you all know, for many years we published biannual transparency reports, which include the volume of content restrictions we make when content is reported as violating local law but doesn’t go against our community standards.

Participating in Lumen is an additional way of bringing added visibility to those requests. And finally I want to touch on the oversight board. Today we’re releasing our third update about our work supporting the board and implementing their recommendations. This update details cases that Meta referred to the board and updates on our responses to the recommendations that the board has made.

To date the board has made over 100 recommendations and we’ve committed to implementing or have already implemented a majority of them. Moving forward we will continue to provide updates on our implementation of the board’s recommendations and we welcome their continued work to help us improve our policies and processes.

Thanks again for joining the call. With that I will turn it over to the operator for questions.

Operator: Thank you. If you would like to register a question, please press the “1,” “4” on your telephone. You will hear a three-tone prompt to acknowledge your request. If your question has been answered and you would like to withdraw your registration, please press the “1” followed by the “3.”

One moment please for your first question. Our first question comes from Alex Heath with The Verge. Please proceed.

Alex Heath: Hi everyone. Thanks for doing this call. I wanted to ask about the recommendations change that you said at the top of the call you made to Russian state backed media? Can you elaborate a little bit on where that is taking place?

Is that just in the E.U., is that everywhere, is it inside Russia. And then also if you could give us an update on the affects that you’re seeing of the Russian governments internet slowdown on your services and any impact that’s had? Thanks.

Nathaniel Gleicher: This is Nathaniel Gleicher. I work on our – I lead our security policy work across the country and across the company. As Nick mentioned, we’ve taken a number of different steps on Russian state media, a couple of things just to
be explicit here, we are – we have blocked them from advertising or monetizing around the world.

We are also demoting content from Russian state media wherever it appears anywhere in the world. As always we have labeled a number of Russian state media entities and our teams are continuing to investigate and identify additional Russian state media entities that we are adding labels to as time passes.

In addition, in response to specific requests from the Ukrainian government and the government in the E.U., we have blocked particular Russian state media entities from messaging into those regions entirely.

And then an additional point that Nick mentioned earlier on the call is that we have also begun to demote posts with the links to Russian state controlled media websites on Facebook. In the days ahead we’re going to label those links so that in addition to seeing labels on the Facebook pages and content form the Facebook pages of these entities, people also see labels that have context on links to their website before clicking on them or sharing them.

We’ll also be taking these steps on Instagram going forward as well. So that will be around the world.

Nick Clegg: And on the – Alex, on your question about the effect of the (throttling) in Russia, yes, we've seen the effects of that since February the 25th, when the – when the government of Russia announced restrictions on the services.

And we see the effects most particularly on – for the video and other multimedia content. And we're seeing that showing up on both Facebook and Instagram in slightly different rates, but the degradation of the service is definitely discernible.

Nathaniel Gleicher: And I should say, we've also removed Russian state media from recommendation services, so they will also not be recommended to users across the platforms.

Next question.

Operator: Our next question comes from Steven Levy with WIRED. Please proceed.

Steven Levy: Hi, thanks all for doing this. I have a question for Nick, it's almost like a policy thing. And then just another quick – one question about the report.
Can you talk, Nick, a little bit about where – how Facebook thinks about participating in what seems like a pretty wide movement against universally agreed upon terrible action by a state actor?

But what's the proper role for a platform during a war like this in terms of taking sides? Is it something where you interpret your policies to fit that? Do you follow the leads of governments? Just your thoughts along that line.

And then the other question is, in looking at the report, the most viewed page in the quarter was something that was removed by Facebook for violating community standards, could you – could someone tell me what that was?

Nick Clegg:

On the first (thing), as I, sort of, tried to elaborate in my opening remarks, we feel that our priorities are, first, to continue to make our services available for people to use as safely and securely as possible, most especially in Russia and Ukraine. And that's where focused, candidly, most of our essence.

But in terms of the global response, not only ourselves but Google, TikTok, (I believe) Microsoft has removed RT and Sputnik from its app store. We – the tech sector as a whole, I suppose, has been responsive, not least in the face of numerous demands that have been made of us on exactly that by governments and regulators in the European Union and in Ukraine.

We're a company – we're a private sector company, we're not a government. We obviously have to respond to these requests as thoughtfully as we can.

But we're also aware that we're in a completely unprecedented situation. And this is a highly exceptional and tragic state of affairs, which is why not only ourselves but many others in the tech sector are taking these pretty exceptional measures at this time.

But you're right to highlight the fact that we are a private sector company which runs apps and services which so happen to be relied upon by millions of people in Russia and Ukraine at a moment of great distress and military conflict. And also, we're having demands made of us by governments in numerous different jurisdictions.

That is quite a difficult balancing trick for us to strike, but we try and do so with the utmost transparency. We try and explain our reasons. And that's why we keep the Newsroom updated as we do and why we'll continue to make calls like this, so that you understand what actions we're taking and the reasons we're taking them.

Guy Rosen:

And this is Guy, I can jump in on the second part of your question. We do have some pages or posts in the widely viewed content report that were
removed for violating policies. This could include things like personal information (bait), inauthentic behavior, phishing, or harassment.

To honor our user data deleting policy we unfortunately can’t share any identifying information about the content that was removed.

Operator: Our next question comes from Kurt Wagner with Bloomberg. Please proceed.

Kurt Wagner: Thanks for taking the question. I’m wondering, Nick, I’m curious if you’ve been in contact with President Zelenskyy or anybody on the ground in Ukraine and what those conversations have been like? Is that a line of communication that’s open at the moment to anyone at Meta?

Nick Clegg: Yes, we received – we received emails and we’ve been (consulting) with the government via email. And much of that – (inaudible) all of it has been (valid) by us you will have seen that we took action against a number of entities and pages in Ukraine at the request of the Ukrainian government. We’ve been open about that.

We’ve also (explain) for what it’s worth that where demands have emanated from. Some senior members of the Ukrainian government that we should somehow disable our services all together inside Russia. We have explained why we don’t agree with that. We think it is essential for as long as this can continue.

But ordinary Russian can use our services to express themselves, to organize, to protect and to reach out to family and friends in the wider community. So, yes, we have done and of course we’re also in constant contact with security partners and civil society organizations within Ukraine and around the world. And we’ve shared information with our industry and government partners to explain how we counter the threat that we’ve identified.

Operator: Our next question comes from Issie Lapowsky with Protocol. Please proceed.

Issie Lapowsky: Thanks for taking my question. So, Nick, you mentioned that this is an unprecedented scenario but obviously Facebook has faced conflict in other regions and you’ve done a lot of intersection about (inaudible) Myanmar. Is that a framework you’re able to apply to these decisions? Or do you find yourself in a position of really having to invent these new policies and procedures as the situation unfolds?

Nick Clegg: No, I think in many ways, Issie, you’re right to say that unfortunately we’ve had to develop our muscles as a company to respond to violence and military conflict and on numerous occasions. And as you and others are quite right it documented that’s been a learning process for the company. I think we’re in a
– I hesitate to say better position, that’s not the right sort of way to talk this perhaps.

But we are definitely drawing on experiences and deploying product innovations and enforcing policies which have developed over time in the face of the experience we’ve had of seeing our services used and of course on occasion abused at times of distress and violence and conflict. And so yes, I think that is definitely the case. We’re not – in other words I think an answer to your question, whilst this does feel in many ways somewhat a typical just because of the – sort of the enormity of the global response, which is quite unusual.

I think many of our reflexes are ones that we have largely developed before. But I’m keen for Guy, Nathaniel, Monika to jump in there (inaudible) what I need to add.

Nathaniel Gleicher: I think you covered it, Nick. Next question.

Operator: Our next – our next question comes from Nando Kasteleijn with NOS. Please proceed.

Nando Kasteleijn: Hi. Good morning. Thank you for taking the question. I have two questions they have made. First is you are – have been restricting our (PS2P) in the E.U. in the Ukraine on request. I was wondering are there talks to broaden this? Maybe make it worldwide for a time period, also focused on Russia?

And the second thing I am wondering, do you fear repercussions in Russia? For example, do you prepare to leave the county our your employers to leave (inaudible) because of maybe (the harassment) from the Russian government. Thank you.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Sure, I can take that. Thanks for the question. We’re continuing to monitor requests from other governments as they come in around the world and respond to them as appropriate.

And we’re certainly watching what’s happening in Russia and taking every step possible to keep people safe within the county and to do everything we can to keep our services available within the country so people can use them to learn accurate information about what’s happening with the war to organize protests and to speak their mind as much as possible.

Operator: Our next question comes from Marcus Schuler with ARD. Please proceed.

Marcus Schuler: Thank you for taking my question. Question for Nick. Nick, why – could you elaborate a little bit on why it’s so difficult for a company like Meta operating
out of a Democratic country to clearly condemn the actions of the Russian government?

Few in the western world, in the whole world except maybe China or India is that this is a war against a much smaller country. It’s an invasion. Why is it so difficult for a company like yours to say hey, there’s a red line that has over stepped and we’re – just delete the accounts of this propaganda, machines that work for the Russian government. Thank you.

Nick Clegg: It would be very difficult to condemn it and I sort of feel we have done so but we’re a company, we’re not a government. So we don’t sit around at the table in the United Nations issuing a bit of government style condemnations.

We are – our priority is trying to keep our services available and safe and secure for the millions of people who use our services in Russia and Ukraine at the time. But we have taken, as we explained earlier, unprecedented action against state controlled media entities from – controlled by the Russian government.

Been doing so on a scale never done before as our other major tech players and we’re doing so in response to overtures and requests and demands from government and regulators in Ukraine and across the European Union.

But remember, at the end of the day the most powerful antidote to propaganda is not only restricting (its) circulation but circulating the answers to it. And that is why we always want to strike the right balance to allow the flow of counter-speech to continue on our services where we are in a position to influence that.

In answer to the earlier question, I don't know what the Russian authorities are going to do to our services. They're already throttling them, and they may go further. That's not in our control.

But we passionately believe as a company, that's why – that's what our company's based on, our whole ethos is that we provide services which are free to use because they're paid for by advertising for millions – billions of ordinary people around the world to express themselves when they want, how they want, where they want, obviously within the constraints of the law and our community standards.

And that, in the long run, in our view – and I think history and experience suggests that that is the case, in the long run the thing that really undermines propaganda is counter-speech. You can of course suppress, restrict, block accounts, and we do all of that and we're very transparent about (we're) doing that.
But I do think at a moment of heightened conflict, it is always important to remember that it is free expression that (in the) end that we should be seeking to help win out more than anything else.

Operator: Our next question comes from Mark Scott with POLITICO. Please proceed.

Mark Scott: Good morning. Thanks for doing this. Just following up on one of the previous questions for Nick in particular, have you received requests from other governments outside of the E.U. and Ukraine to block or geoblock the Russian state media outlets?

And second of all, counter-speech and free speech is the way to block and to win against propaganda from the Russian government, but are there any nuclear options on the table in terms of, sort of, de-listing and taking – removing these accounts from your – from the platforms? Thank you.

Nick Clegg: Well, obviously this is such an unprecedented and horrifying set of events, Mark, I really can't predict to you how they're going to unfold, (let) alone how we are going to have to adapt to and respond to them.

So I don't want to pretend that things are, sort of, off the table. We are – we all feel, I think the whole world feels, we are entering into territory here. So of course we'll keep an open mind. But we will continue along the sort of trendlines, all other things being equal, that we've set out to you today.

I think we have received some requests from other governments outside the European Union. I don't – I'm reluctant (to mark) the Euro running tally, because literally things change minute-by-minute. And I'm sure that our teams in other parts of the world are responding to some of those requests right now. But I can certainly confirm that we have received some similar requests outside the European Union.

Operator: Our next question comes from Queenie Wong with CNET. Please proceed.

Queenie Wong: Hi, this question is for Nick. You mentioned earlier on in this press call that Russia had restricted your services and the effects were seen particularly on video and other multimedia content. And the degradation of the service is definitely discernible, those were your words.

Can you share more details about in what ways have they restricted your services in Russia? And in terms of, like, the demotion of Russian state-controlled media content on Facebook and Instagram and also with sharing links, does that also apply to your messaging app WhatsApp?
Nick Clegg: On the first, I'll let – I'll let Nathaniel (and) Monika (come on second). On the first I can’t give you too much detail because this sort of thing happens, if you like how I can put it, at the backend I guess the regulators intervene with the ISPs and the technology of that is something that we can speculate on but it’s not – it’s not our proprietary technology it’s the infrastructure in Russia which is being deployed to (throttle) it.

So I can describe to you where we’re seeing the effect which is (greatest) in the way that I described particularly on video and multimedia formats. It also could lead to significant delays. And the effect is not identical on Facebook and Instagram either. And it will vary, it will vary in place and in time. And so the (throttling) may be more extreme by the end of the day, we just don’t know.

But we’ll try and share as much information going forward as we – as we – as we reasonably can.

Nathaniel Gleicher: On the second piece of the question, the down ranking and other steps we’re taking, apply most primarily to Facebook and we’re continuing to roll them out on Instagram as well. WhatsApp is a somewhat different platform among other things it’s an end-to-end encrypted platform so we don’t have access to the content of these messages.

We’ll be continuing to monitor the situation and assess the way people are using the platforms. I think, as Nick just said, the situation on the ground is changing by the hour so we’ll continue to evolve our approach as the situation changes.

Next question.

Operator: Our last question comes from Musadiq Bidar with CBS News. Please proceed.

Musadiq Bidar: Good morning. Thank you for taking my question. I know you have received requests from governments outside of the E.U. to consider banning Russian states on media and now you’re demonetizing their accounts here in the U.S. I would like to know if you’re considering the request from the U.S. government specifically to block (RCM), Sputnik and other Russian states on the – from Facebook for all users here in America.

So have you gotten such a request from the U.S. government?

Nick Clegg: No, I’m not aware – I’m not aware that we have.

Musadiq Bidar: Thank you.
Nick Clegg: Next question. We’ve probably got time for one more.

Operator: Next question comes from Sheila Dang with Reuters. Please proceed.

Sheila Dang: Hi, thanks for taking my question. I wanted to ask about the new Russian law that the communications regulators said that they would start enforcing today which requires tech companies to have an office in Russia and be registered with the regulator. Can you talk about any steps that Meta has taken to comply with those new laws or does it not intend to comply?

Nick Clegg: Yes, we were obviously in intensive discussions with the Russian regulator on that, I think they call it the Localization Law, prior to the eruption of the violence that is now occurring in Ukraine. And of course we’ve sought to take steps to comply with aspects of the law where we feel we can – we can in sort of good conscious do so.

We have been in (protective) discussions with the regulator about some of the provisions which we feel are disproportionate and which we struggle to sort of (inaudible) understand or plan to fully put into effect. And those discussions were ongoing right (until the) point that the invasion in Ukraine occurred, and so for the rest, it will (either be for the) Russian regulator to confirm to you what steps they want to take, both with regard to method but also to the other large non-Russian tech companies that operate within Russia.

But it was – it was definitely part of an ongoing and hitherto unresolved process in our discussions in the regulator.

Carolyn Glanville: We'll turn it over to the operator.

Operator: That does conclude the conference call for today. We thank you for your participation and ask that you please disconnect your line. Have a great day, everyone.

Carolyn Glanville: Thank you all so much. And just a reminder, the embargo of materials sent earlier today lifts at 9:30 Pacific Time. If you have any additional questions, please reach out to the (press at email at alias). Thank you.

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