Hello and welcome to today's Facebook Press Call. There will be prepared remarks and a Q&A to follow. To ask a question after the prepared remarks conclude, please press "star" "one." Now, I'd like to turn the call over to Tom Reynolds who will introduce today's speakers.

Thanks, Operator. And thanks everybody for joining us today. I'm Tom Reynolds from the Facebook communications team. With just under four weeks until Election Day, we wanted to give you a briefing on where we are in terms of preparations and readiness.

The reality is we've been at this work since 2016. And the company and our approach to the elections has obviously changed a lot since then. This includes taking an aggressive proactive approach to fighting interference, combating misinformation, blocking voter suppression efforts.

And in that time we've worked on more than 200 elections around the globe, including obviously the U.S. midterms but also elections in the E.U., and Indonesia, India, Australia, Israel and elsewhere, and improving with each one. In short, we believe we are better prepared than ever as we head toward November 3rd.

On the call today, you'll hear from Guy Rosen, vice president of integrity here at Facebook, Monika Bickert, vice president for content policy, Nathaniel Gleicher, who is our head of security policy; and Sarah Schiff, the product lead for political advertising is also on to help answer any questions after the opening remarks.
Before we dive in, in addition to our Newsroom posts, we also shared two pieces we hope are helpful for you. One is a timeline of the key election integrity efforts that we put in place in 2016 and the other is a summary of our elections-related policies. Both are linked into the Newsroom post and, again, we hope they are helpful for your reporting.

And then lastly, this call is on the record. And as we agreed to, it is -- all the materials are under embargo until the call concludes. With that, let me turn it over to Guy to get it started.

Guy Rosen: Thank you. And good afternoon, everyone. As Tom noted, our plan today is to give an overview of where we are in terms of our preparations for Election Day.

We believe we have done more than any other company over the past four years to help secure the integrity of elections and that includes disrupting interference, fighting misinformation, combating voter suppression. And at the same time, we are also running a historic voter registration drive this year.

Since 2016, we have disrupted more than 100 networks for coordinated, inauthentic behavior. We’ve hired more than 35,000 people for safety and security work. And we are the only tech platform to build a global fact checking network, which now includes over 70 fact checking organizations globally.

As we’ve done for other elections, and throughout this election, primaries, the debates, conventions, we’ve activated our elections operations center. This is where we have the experts in security and threat investigations from across our engineering, our operations, our policy, and other teams work together to identify and to stop suspicious activity that maybe happening on our platform.

One tool we’ve built for the operations center is our crisis assessment dashboard. This monitors signals and content across all 50 states. And our operation center team watches this to correlate spikes, it can be for example in hate speech or in voter (interfering) content, and we do this in near real time.
And any anomalies can be investigated, they can be routed to teams who can review the content, investigate its origins, and remove any content or any MVPs that violate our policies.

Another important system worth mentioning is a viral content review system that we’ve built that runs in parallel to our regular review flows and it flags posts that may be going viral, no matter what type of content it is. This is an additional safety net. This system helps us catch content that our regular flows may not pick up fast enough.

And we’ve been using this tool throughout this election season to detect and review posts on Facebook and on Instagram that are likely to go viral and can take action based on our policies. Now lastly, this is shaping up to be a very unique election, and I want to mention our approach for election night results and the various scenarios that may follow as well.

As election night unfolds, we’re going to be sending notifications at the top of Facebook and Instagram to help people know what to expect and to show the latest results. We’re partnering on this with Reuters and with the National Election Pool. And we’ll show results for the Presidential, House, and Senate races in our voting information center.

If a Presidential Candidate or Party declares premature victory, before the race is called by major media outlets, we will apply labels to those posts stating that counting is still in progress and no winner has been determined.

Similarly, if a winner is declared but is contested in posts by another candidate or party, we’ll label posts showing the name of the winner.

Finally we’re going to increase our protections around political ads. We previously announced that we will block the creation of new political and issue ads in the last week before the election.

And that’s only ads which ran before that final week, may continue to run through election day. This allows those ads to be transparent in our ad library, meaning anyone, including fact checkers and journalists, can scrutinize them.
And today, we’re sharing that after the poll closed on November 3rd, we’re going to stop running all political and issue ads to reduce opportunities for any confusion or abuse. We will notify advertisers when this policy is lifted later. With that, I’ll turn it over to Monika.

Monika Bickert: Thanks, Guy. I’m going to briefly walk through the work that we’re doing to combat voter interference, misinformation, and hate speech, each of which my team has been highly focused on.

As many of you may already know, we've had a voter interference policy on the books and 2016 and over the last three years, we have worked with civil rights organizations and our civil rights auditors to strengthen and expand that policy to account for new trends and tactics that are being used to try to suppress and intimidate voters as well as to account for the realities of voting during a global pandemic and the resulting uptick we expect to see in mail-in voting this election.

Now our policies on voter interference are outlined in our community standards so I won't go through them all here in detail, but there are five points that I want to make about our work in this area. First, the policies themselves.

The policies reflect a wide range of both explicit and implicit attempts to interfere with people's right to vote. So for explicit, we prohibit misrepresentations about how or when to vote, that could cause someone to lose their opportunity to vote. For example, saying things like, you can send in your mail-in up to three days after the election, it will still count; which is obviously not true.

We also prohibit implicit misrepresentations about voting, including I hear anybody with a driver's license gets a ballot this year, because although it's not explicitly are certainly making a misrepresentation, it might mislead you about what you need to do to get a ballot.

And as we shared in our Newsroom post today, we have also updating our policies to remove calls to watch the polls, meaning like go to the polls, watch and monitor the polls, when those polls used militarized language or suggest
that the goal is to intimidate, control, or display power over election officials or voters.

Now this policy really builds on some of our existing policies like our prohibition of calls for coordinated interference of voting and our statements about bringing weapons to polling places, we don't allow people to say they're going to or to encourage others to bring weapons to polling places.

And I really want to thank the civil rights experts and the other community members who have continued to help us understand the trends in this area and look forward to continuing to work with them.

Second, we have systems that proactively search for and identify this content so that we can remove anything that violates quickly. During the midterm elections, we removed over 90 percent of the letter suppression content we found on our platform proactively, meaning that we removed it before anybody reported it to us.

We’ve improved this technology by working with our civil rights auditors and voting rights consultants to account for a broader set of historical voter suppression examples in our proactive searches.

And as we noted in the Newsroom post, between March and September of this year, we removed more than 120,000 pieces of Facebook and Instagram content in the U.S. for violating our voter interference policies.

Third, I want to underscore that we removed this content regardless of who posts it, and that includes removing content posted by the president and all of the politicians when it violates our policies.

Fourth, on the advertising side, our policies go even further. We prohibit efforts to discourage participation in the election or that characterized voting as meaningless or useless and the delegitimizing claims about voting or the election, including attempts to delegitimize lawful methods of voting.

And fifth -- and this is also something I really want to underscore, we don’t ever do this work alone. We continue to get input from the civil rights
community and others as we refine and improve our policies and our processes.

And we work closely with state election authorities and the attorneys general to hear directly from them if they're seen voter interference attempts. And we work quickly to review this content to remove if we determine it violates our policies.

As political rhetoric heats up, we also want to make sure that we are taking quick and decisive action against hate on our services. We were the first company to publish a comprehensive policy on hate speech, a definition that is now substantially matched by the policies of the other companies.

As we remain the only company to share as much internal detail about how we define hate speech and we make those definitions available on our community standard site for the general public to review, we also continue to make progress in this area.

As we said in our last community standards enforcement report, 95 percent of the hate speech we removed in the second quarter this year was detected proactively before anyone reported it to us.

As we head into the final days of this election, we know that we will see spikes in potentially violating content that may try to intimidate voters or interfere with and suppress the votes, and that’s why we’ve invested so heavily in these areas.

Now it doesn’t mean that we consider our work complete. We know that we will miss things and that our enforcement won’t be perfect, and that’s why we’ll keep working to get better and to make sure we’re doing our part to protect the integrity of this election. And with that, I’ll hand it over to Nathaniel.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Thank you Monika. As many of you know, our security teams have been working around the clock to detect and remove sophisticated threat actors, including those running influence operations.
To date, we’ve removed over 100 of these deceptive campaigns around the world, including ahead of major democratic elections. This work is a focus for us year round, but it’s been especially critical in the run-up to Election Day here in the U.S. as we see both foreign and domestic actors target public debate in the United States ahead of the election.

The efforts of these teams have fueled one of the biggest differences between the 2016 election and today. In 2016, Russian actor’s deception campaigns were exposed in the months after the election.

Today, they’re getting caught and taken down months and in some cases more than a year in advance. Today, I’ll share details on our September enforcements against what we coordinated inauthentic behavior, which includes both foreign interference and domestic actors.

And I’ll talk through key adversarial trends that we see and the ways we work to counter them ahead of November. Late last month, we shared our findings about five influence operations we removed, three from Russia, one from China, and another one from the Philippines. These networks targeted many countries around the world, including some limited targeting in the United States.

A majority of these enforcements extend a consistent pattern we have seen. They had very limited following globally when we took them down. This is one indicator that our combination of audited scaled enforcement and expert investigation is making it harder for these campaigns to go undetected.

Much of this activity focused on two things, first creating fictitious or seemingly independent media entities and personas to engage unwitting people, both on our platform and across the broader internet, to try to trick them into amplifying their content.

And second, driving people to off-platform websites that these operations control. Similarly to the Russia base network Peace Data that we removed back in August, the Russia based operations in particular that we removed in September worked across many internet services and attempted to hire contributors and feed their stories to unwitting news organizations.
The techniques we see here, which are similar to those we’ve seen throughout 2020, reinforce that these actors are increasingly focused on what we call perception hacking. That is as it gets harder and harder to run large scale influence operation campaigns on social media forums because they’re getting caught, they’re trying instead to plant our fears as voters.

Why run a large campaign that will get caught when you can try and trick people into thinking such a campaign is happening? Getting ahead of this risk is one reason why we have focused so much in recent months on getting out accurate, up to date information, sharing with the public through a voting information center how to vote, where to vote, and the protections in place around voting.

Our industry partners as well as FBI and DHS have also been vocal in recent weeks about all of the work being done to protect our elections. And the ways that bad actors might still try to target us. We know that one powerful tool against manipulation is minimizing uncertainty and making verified information accessible throughout the process.

One type of perception hacking we should all be ready for are for hack and leak (operations), where a bad actor steals (inaudible) information, often manipulates and then strategically uses it to influence public debate.

We haven’t seen specific evidence of an impending hack leak yet, but Russian actors relied on this technique in 2016, and we should all be ready in case they or others try again. Our Facebook protect program which provides enhanced security for campaigns, politicians, and other civic actors is one step we’ve taken to help campaigns secure their accounts and be ready for this risk.

Our CIB takedowns are another tool in our toolbox. The Russian networks that we removed in September that I mentioned earlier were linked to the very same actors associated with election interference in the U.S. in the past, including those involved in the D.C. leaks – hack and leak operation in 2016.

We anticipate that operations like these, even though they were largely focused overseas, could attempt to pivot to the United States at any time.
That’s why it’s important that we all keep vigilant in the weeks to come, and that’s why we will continue to share what we find with you all.

In addition, we have policies related to hacked and leaked material in our community standards. We remove material obtained via a hack and posted on our platforms. Think of the e-mails stolen from the DNC in 2016. Notably, even without evidence of a hack, we will remove leaked material that is released as part of a foreign government backed influence operation, even if off platform, to target the U.S. 2020 election.

In addition to removing the material itself, we will also remove coverage of the leak by state media entities from the country behind the operation.

From the past three years of studying and removing various threat actors we know that these threats (are not) limited to one platform or industry, they are a whole of society challenge. The people behind this malicious activity will continue to try and improve their tactics, and so will we.

To that end, we’re working with partners across industry to tackle these threats. For several years tech companies have worked together and the U.S. government agency tasked with protecting the integrity of elections, to counter election threats across our respective platforms.

As we get close to the November election we continue to meet regularly and share updates on the threats we see so each of us can respond quickly, effectively and accordingly.

It’s important that we all stay vigilant, but also know that there are teams across the tech sector, the researcher community and government agencies tasked with protecting the election who are on the lookout for these actors both foreign and domestic.

We will continue to enforce our policies aggressively, and to share our findings with you to provide context for the adversarial trends we see. With that, I’ll turn it back to Tom.
Tom Reynolds: Thanks everybody. Operator, we can move in to Q&A, if you want to prompt our guests on how to ask questions.

Operator: We will now open the line for questions. Please limit yourself to one question per person. To ask a question press “star” followed by the number “1”. Your first question comes from the line of Mike Isaac from “The New York Times.” Please go ahead.

Mike Isaac: Hi everyone, thanks for doing this call. I guess I’m just -- I wanted to know -- a few weeks ago when we talked about the series of updates you all were making to safeguard the elections, it was pretty clearly put that this was going to be the last series of changes. And now, here we are a couple weeks later and this is another pretty big update.

So I guess I'm just wondering what caused that reversal. Was it -- were there specific concerns or different things that were changing that you didn't anticipate? Or did the alert just sort of get -- go higher or something? Any clarity on that would be great. Thank you.

Guy Rosen: Hey, Mike. This is Guy. Thanks for the question.

Mike Isaac: Sure.

Guy Rosen: We're continuing -- we continually evaluate and have been going through planning, understanding different scenarios, drawing on our learnings from different elections that we've protected to date based on the teams that we have built.

This scenario planning continues to be -- has continued to be under way. And we thought it was appropriate to introduce these new measures as we head into this final stretch, and particularly as we think about -- as we think about the period after the election itself.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Katie Paul from Reuters. Please, go ahead.
Katie Paul: Hi, guys. Thanks so much. I am wondering if you could expand on the label for a contested election? What exactly is that going to look like? It wasn't included in the mock-up exactly. Do you have language for that? And how exactly will it be displayed?

Guy Rosen: Hey. This is Guy. Thanks for the question. So there's a few ways, stepping back, that we're going to make sure that people understand what the process is.

As I mentioned, first of all, we're going to be putting notifications at the top of people's feed in Facebook and Instagram that direct them to the Voter Information Center, which is where we'll have all of the full results.

The -- we're still working on the specifics for the various versions of this label and how it will be applied. But at a high level, the label will say what the current status is of accounts.

So for example in the case of a premature declaration of victory, you can imagine a label that says the election has not been called. And that is the same information that we are also going to have at the top of feeds and the same information that we're going to have in the Voter Information Center.

All of this is really important for us to ensure that we have -- we are putting the accurate information in front of people and directing them to the Voter Information Center, where they're going to have -- be able to dig through and understand the full process, and where the election results and the counting process is so that they understand the current state of affairs.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Brian Fung from CNN. Please go ahead.

Brian Fung: Hi, guys. Thanks for doing the call. Monika, I wonder if you might be able to expand on the process that will play out when you're confronted with content that calls for Americans to report to the polls as poll watchers, if it uses militarized language, or if it's trying to intimidate -- or urge people to intimidate voters?
Can you just walk through, if you receive or detect something that fits that description, what the -- who is going to be making decisions on that content and who is going to be interpreting the policy?

Monika Bickert: Sure. And let me be sort of clear on what the details of the policy are. There are two prongs to it. And the first is we’ll remove statements of intent or support or advocacy to go to a polling location or election site where there’s militarized language. And that means words like “army” or “battle”.

Now one of the things that’s been tricky with that prong is we’ve been kind of hashing out how we will apply this, is sometimes people will also use words – when their talking about volunteers. Like “come and join our ranks”, rank can also of course be a military word. So, we’re trying to strike the right balance there and we’ll look to militarize language to be things that are more like “army” or “battle”.

But the second prong of the policy is that we will also remove calls to go to the polls to monitor if it references a goal of intimidation, or exerting control, or showing power. And a lot of that is to try to get at some of the more implicit content.

We have for a long time prohibited people from encouraging people to bring weapons to polling places, or engaging in explicit coordination to try to stop people from voting.

Like hey let’s go to the polls and make sure that only the right people vote. So we already would have removed that and what we’re trying to do now is get to this more implicit speech. So we’ve crafted those guidelines that I’ve just explained and we are training our teams in applying those and it will be my team that will be looking at that content as we find it in making those decisions.

Operator: Our next question comes from the line of Shannon Bond from National Public Radio.
Shannon Bone: Hi guys, thanks for taking the question. I guess so following up on that point exactly, so when there is a case where you have a video that’s running on Facebook right now, the Donald Trump, Jr. ad calling for an army.

I think previously – actually NPR asked Sheryl Sandberg about this, she said saw we this as sort of metaphorical language. Does this new policy mean that a video like that would be taken down?

Monika Bickert: Yes, it does. Yes (inaudible).

Shannon Bond: (Inaudible) taken down?

Monika Bickert: Earlier Guy mentioned that we – this is a part of a process that we will always sort of continue to refine our policies and our enforcement based on the feedback that we get from the community.

So, we’ve definitely been continuing to talk to civil rights auditors and other members of the civil rights community to try to understand what this content looks like and under the new policy if that video were to be posted again, we would indeed remove it.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of David Ingram from NBC News. Please go ahead.

David Ingram: Hi there. Thanks for taking the question. I was going to ask about something else, but I now want to follow up, Monika if I could ask. Does that mean that only future videos like the Donald Trump, Jr. one would be taken down or would this apply retroactively?

And then, sorry if I could ask my original question, it was about this sort of post election quiet period for election ads. I just wanted to make sure – that strikes me as new as of today, I just wanted to double check that was new and see if Guy, if you might be able to elaborate on sort of the concerns that the company has there?

Monika Bickert: Guy, maybe I’ll start and then throw it over. So this is Monika. Yes, it does mean that we apply this policy going forward. We don’t apply – when we
change our policies we generally do not apply them retroactively, of course we have billions of new posts on this site everyday so our general rule is when we pass policies they apply going forward to the content on the site.

Sarah Schiff: Hi, this is Sarah, I lead our political advertising project, and yes, this is news as of today that once the polls close, we will stop U.S. social issue electoral and political advertising in the United States.

Just wanted to clarify that there is a restriction period in place in the final week ahead of the election as well as a new post Election Day decision to pause and stop running U.S. social issue, electoral and political ads.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Issie Lapowsky from Protocol. Please go ahead.

Issie Lapowsky: Hi, thank you so much for taking my question and for taking the time you guys. I wanted to go back to the new policy around intimidation, around poll watching, and try to get to a little bit of the motivation for why releasing this now. I wonder is that new policy related at all to what we saw the President say last week during the debate about having the Proud Boys stand by?

Sarah Schiff: I would say this policy is something that we’ve been talking to experts about for many months since we started looking at what people might do to try and discourage people from actually voting. Of course recently we have seen speech that has been more implicit in a number of different areas with our policy.

So for instance with voter suppression, I talked about earlier how we’ve expanded our voter suppression policy from saying instead of just misrepresentation about exactly how to vote, we’re also removing the more implicit language like hey, I heard at the coffee shop today that if you just show up with a drivers license, you don’t have to be otherwise registered.

That’s another example of where we’re looking at more implicit language, and this is very much the same. The civil rights auditors and the civil rights community members that we talk to on a regular basis have really helped us sort of track some of these trends.
It’s a very adversarial space, of course, and we anticipate that although we have updated these lines, those who are seeking to try to get around them will try to use new language, so that’s the sort of thing we try to stay on top of.

Your next question comes from the line of Casey Newton from Platformer. Please go ahead.

Hi. I had a question about the updated political ad ban after the election. One, I wondered if you could give us any sense of how long you expected to last? I’m sure it will be dependent on events, but are you thinking in terms of weeks or months?

And then I’m also just wondering if you could just share any of your thinking around why this might be helpful, if there was something specific that made you think of this or sort of what is the threat that you’re trying to manage here?

Thanks for the question, this is Sarah. We will stop running U.S. social issue, electoral and political ads once the polls close on November 3rd. Advertisers can expect this to last for a week, so this is subject to change and we will notify advertisers when this policy is lifted.

We know that this election will be unlike any other. We are continuing to build on efforts that promote authoritative information about the election, reduce the spread of misinformation and combat foreign interference.

While ads are an important way to express voice, we are temporarily stopping these ads after the election to reduce opportunities for confusion or abuse. We’ve said all along that we’re committed to improving, and this announcement reflects that commitment to continuously evaluate and evolve our approach.

Your next question comes from the line of Danielle Abril from Fortune, please go ahead.
Danielle Abril: Hi, thanks so much for taking our call. Actually, one quick follow-up question from a question that was already asked and then on to my original question. I know you mentioned on the sort of the militarized language and the poll watching new policy that the -- did I understand this correctly, the posts that are already up that have that language will not be removed it’s only new posts.

So old posts will remain with that language? That’s the first question. And then the quick question on the numbers that you guys provided that give us a look into how much content you guys have acted on, those are new numbers, correct? I don’t think I’ve seen those before but I wanted to double check.

Monika Bickert: Yes, so first on the -- on the militarized language and intimidation language policy, yes, that applies going forward. That’s what we typically do when we launch policies., both for the practical reason that we have so many posts on the site everyday and also from a notice standpoint.

We think it’s important to tell people when they come to Facebook and are posting on the site, here’s what our rules are. And so we don’t -- we don’t generally go back retroactively and apply those rules to people who posted before we had the rule in place.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Yes. And then on the numbers, I can confirm those are new as is noted in the news room post, those are between March and September.

Operator: Line of Queenie Wong from CNET. Please go ahead.

Queenie Wong: Hi, I was wondering what is Facebook doing to combat election misinformation in private spaces like messaging, like WhatsApp or Messenger, for example and in ephemeral content such as Stories.

So you talked about notifications and labels being applied on the -- on the main social networks and Instagram. Will this same feature be used in messaging or in ephemeral content?

Guy Rosen: Hey, this is Guy. Let me step back and give an overview of some of the different kind of spaces and how our enforcement applies in them. So first of
all, one area we’ve also been focused on is groups, our proactive systems work on groups, including private groups and we have taken down content.

We continue to take down content proactively, including in groups that are private. We also -- once we have misinformation that our third party fact checker has rated, we also match it to content inside private groups and that ensures that even those spaces are spaces where our places are enforced.

Now on messaging on Messenger, which is used in the U.S., we have implemented limitations on how many messages people can forward. This is a -- this is something we have learned through our work on WhatsApp internationally around the world as a mechanism that helps to reduce potentially the amount of misinformation across the system.

On WhatsApp specifically, we talk a bunch in different opportunities about the work we do to protect integrity of elections and to protect people’s safety on WhatsApp, we banned mass messaging. We remove over 2 million accounts per month.

We’ve also, on WhatsApp, partnered with the International Fact Checking Network. We have a WhatsApp bot, if you will, that people can message called Fact Chat where people can get accurate information. Vote.org is also now available on WhatsApp so that people can get information on how to register to vote or if they encounter a problem at the polls.

And overall, these spaces are incredibly important. At the end of a day, encrypted space provides security, which we know is really important so that people can have those -- can have conversations, be protected from cyber threats that also very important.

And so we're proud that we're able to provide this secure messaging system and also we've extended and we're applying rigorous safety measures to ensure that we are protecting people on all of these different private spaces.
Sarah Frier: Hi, I'm wondering if you can give me a little bit more insight to the process for finding violating codes? Are you leaning mostly on local election authorities, do you have people proactively searching for this? Or are you relying mostly on your A.I.? If you could give me a little bit more detail on that, that would be appreciated.

Guy Rosen: Hey, this is Guy. And probably the short version is all of the above and more. The longer version is really thinking about our election operations center, which is really sort of the nerve center where we try to synthesize all of that information that coming in across the different channels, both reactively and proactively.

The way the election operations center works is, actually we've, in response to the fact that we don't have a physical war room right now due to the pandemic, we have gone to a virtual format. We have formed into certain pods, and each of the pods is responsible for a certain area of work, such as organic content, ads, misinformation, proactive monitoring across all 50 states, deep investigation.

And so our teams are relying on signals that are coming in from our regular at-scale review, people report content, our A.I. is running and proactively detecting content.

We have this crisis assessment dashboard that I described upfront, where the team and election operations center is monitoring in -- almost in real time -- different trends across states, so that is something is spiking, if there's something that seems anomalous, they can jump in and understand that something is happening and sort of take a deeper look.

And we also have this additional review system that we have built, which looks at the most viral content or the content that we believe is going to go viral on Facebook, and make sure we get the eyes of those people on that content ahead of time and confirm and check whether it violates our policies.

All of this happens together and is basically pulled into the operations center so that me have this complete view and that we can rapidly respond to scenarios we plan for and can use scenarios that may come up because it's
really important for us to be able to detect and to respond very fast to situations that are developing in real time.

Nathaniel Gleicher: This is Nathaniel. I'll just add a big part of our rapid response framework is having very close relationships with government officials, both state elections officials and federal officials.

We found in number of cases that our partnership with for example, the FBI or DHS and our ties to state elections officials who might see new threats as they develop first, means that we see quickly and respond very fast as they develop.

Operator: Your next question comes from the mind of Jeff Horwitz from the Wall Street Journal. Please go ahead.

Jeff Horwitz: Yes hi, so two parts to this one. The first one is, can you tell me what portion of user submitted content is handled by -- is addressed one where the other by the platform within 24 hours in terms of violation?

And then the second question is, am I right in thinking that the rules related to election -- or polling location-related violence and election-related threats do not apply to generalized threats of political violence or statements that political violence would be a legitimate means to a political end of some variety?

So for example, we should attack BLM supporters, Trump supporters, Biden supporters, (name here) -- that is still allowed so long as it low-severity violence, is that correct?

Guy Rosen: Hey. This is Guy. I'll take the first part of your question. And then I think Monika can answer the second part.

So we've described on a number of different occasions, and we're happy to re-circulate that material, our approach to content moderation and how we think about combining both our automated systems and reports that are coming in from users.
We prioritize the time -- the review that our teams do based on severity of content, based on the virality of content so that we can get to the content that may be causing the most harm, the content that is being seen by the most people.

This relates to how we think about content moderation work in our work with -- toward the goal of reducing the prevalence of content -- of harmful content that is on the site. That means we do prioritize across both content that is detected by our systems and content that is coming in from and being reported by users.

It also means that we may not be able to get to all user reports if our systems are prioritizing reports that are coming in and being detected by other users or by our systems. And those that are higher severity or being seen by a larger amount of people.

That's sort of how we think about the prioritization of that work and it's what enables our teams to be the most effective. We don't have specific stats that we're sharing about that process. But that at a high level is how we think about this. I mean, we have actually a blog post, from I think last month, which articulates some of this process.

Monika Bickert: And I can take the second question. And no, we don't have a limitation on -- well, let me try and say that again. No, that's not correct. We would remove any content that contains statements of intent, or calls for action, or encouraging or advocating for violence due to voting, or voter registration, or the outcome, or the administration of the election. And that is regardless of whether it is high, medium, or low severity.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Sal Rodriguez from CNBC. Please go ahead.

Sal Rodriguez: Yes, hi there. How's it going? I think Sarah might have already answered this. But I was just going to ask if this temporary ban is going to expand beyond the U.S. election or perhaps become permanent. But I feel like you've addressed that.
Sarah Schiff: This is Sarah. This does not apply to any other countries outside the U.S. at this time. We have not discussed doing this for other elections in other countries, but we would certainly share any additional news when we have it.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Fergal Gallagher from ABC News. Please go ahead.

Fergal Gallagher: Hi. How are you doing? A similar question on enforcement again, going back to the polls question. So firstly, as you said, there's no military language. So if there are calls for people to come and watch the call -- watch the polls for rigging or for something that suggests something nefarious but there's no military language, will those be flagged?

And then more largely on the enforcement question, who -- and I think it has been -- someone has asked already but how does this enforcement happen and Monika, is it your team because I know it -- previous things have been missed.

It’s said well that you went to contractors and then the experts didn’t get to analyze the reports that came in from tips. So I guess is that different with the election? Will anything election related direct go immediately to Facebook staff?

Monika Bickert: So on this policy, it is generally my team who will be handling this enforcement. Of course there may be something that we would want to discuss with others in the company but it’s generally my team who will be making these enforcement decisions.

And in terms of where exactly we’re drawing the line, there are of course legitimate reasons that people might want to volunteer to work at the polls and there may be reasons that people want to talk about election moderating and poll watching. So we really need more context before we can remove something.

And that’s why we’ve written the clauses in our policy to specifically cover the types of language that we’re seeing and that civil rights experts are seeing used to try to generate voter intimidation.
For us this is really about spotting when people are trying to discourage or stop others from voting. That’s really the heart of the policy here. And we often need more context to really understand why that’s happening.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Glenn Chapman from AFP. Please go ahead.

Glenn Chapman: Hi, everybody. Yes, thanks for this. Just a couple of quick points. Nathaniel, you referenced earlier seeing activity from domestic and foreign actors, could you expand a little bit on what kind of domestic actors you’ve seen and if there’s been a noticeable change in activity recently and then recent weeks are getting close to the election?

And then kind of broadly, the newest updates here that’s going to be announced are focusing pretty tightly on the Election Day itself and obviously the week after. What new information or concern, whether it was in the civil rights leader, kind of what prompted this to become a little point that you thought needed tightening down (inaudible)? Are you there?

Nathaniel Gleicher: Hi, this is Nathaniel. I’ll take the first -- yes. I’ll take the first piece of that question. When I said foreign -- both foreign and domestic actors what I meant is when we investigate for any kind of inauthentic behavior, particularly these networks of coordinated inauthentic behavior, we take action based on the behavior that actors are engaged in as opposed to who they are, what they’re saying or what country they’re from.

So example, the takedowns that I referenced in September, some of those were foreign actors and some of them were domestic. In the United States, over the course of the summer, we’ve enforced a couple of times on domestic networks here in the U.S., including for example, a network operating within the United States targeting public debate in the U.S. that showed some lengths to Roger Stone and his associates.

Over -- you’re also asking about the trends that we’ve seen. What I would say is we continue to hunt for, find, and expose these networks whether domestic or foreign. The most significant trend that we’ve seen is that more and more
we see that these networks are smaller and getting less reach because they’re getting caught earlier and not able to build as large of an audience.

As you head into an election, all types of content around electoral issues obviously increase in volume because more and more people are engaging but we haven’t seen any particular spikes in the deceptive behavior that we’re referring to. We continue to find it, we continue to expose it, and we continue to enforce against it whatever we do.

Guy Rosen: Hey this is Guy, I'll take the second part of your question. If we step back, this is something we've been working on for a long time and we started our scenario planning work for this election after the midterm, so sort of early 2019.

But really this is part of a multiyear marathon journey that we've been on to understand risks and across elections and implement around the world and continually learn and understand what are the different risks, what are the different abuse factors, how can our products be used and how can they be of use.

We recruited a lot of keen specialists in these kinds of areas as a company and have gone for a lot of really meticulous scenario planning exercises. We also completely listen to feedback from the community, to feedback from the civil rights community, to feedback from the security community.

And we continue to explore some of the scenarios; some of them we've been very public about and Mark has mentioned in a previous posts and in previous calls or interviews how we're thinking about that period post the election and just thought it's really important to continue to think through and plan for the different scenarios that may occur.

It's important for us to be ready. We don't know exactly what will happen, maybe it'll be very straightforward, maybe it'll get complicated.

It's important for us as a company to be really -- to be prepared to have all of these tools at our disposal, so we continue to do this planning and this is -- we
wanted to share updates of the tools that we've built as we continue to work through that.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Thanks, Guy. Operator, we're going to have time for two more questions, please.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Elizabeth Culliford from Reuters. Please go ahead.

Elizabeth Culliford: Hi, thanks guys. So as I understand it, Facebook is going to label presidential candidates posts if they prematurely claim victory or if the contest a declared winner. Tell me if it's only one of those and I've got it wrong.

But I'm interested how quickly that labeling will happen, kind of what the aim of that is, because I know it's been taking a while to get more explicit or more descriptive labels onto Facebook posts, whether it's been voting misinformation, to give more than that, sort of automatic link to the voting center.

And then I also had a follow up on the moderation aspect that you touched on. I was wondering if you're shifting, you have more contracts, content moderators onto election work who wouldn’t normally be focused on this? And if you can quantify that in any way. Thanks.

Guy Rosen: Hey, this is Guy. So let me try to take a few pieces of the question. The -- so you gave the two scenarios of a different label, both are correct, we will apply a label when a candidate posts prematurely about victory and in case where a candidate contests the outcome when that outcome has been generally accepted.

I disagree with your point on speed. We have systems that are -- that work in real time and are applying their labels to post actually at scale.

We then continue to review and understand and make sure that we're putting all the right, in front of people and we're putting this information at the top of newsfeed on Facebook and on Instagram. It's going to be very hard for people
to miss what the authoritative information is, and that's really important for us to make sure that we are putting that information.

On the last part of your question, I don't have any specific figures, but absolutely -- pretty much all of our teams that are working across globally and have been working on content review and security. This is a very unique election.

We have a lot of people across our teams focused on this and ensuring that across the many different areas in which we operate we are understanding what may manifest, what may come into play in the context of the -- of this election.

(As much as) we have done for other elections, but this one is obviously a very unique one in terms of the environment in the country and in the world this year. And so, it's really important of us to make sure that we're putting all eyes on this and that we are very diligent and very prepared for scenarios that may occur.

Operator: Your last question comes from the line of Chris Mills from The Hill. Please go ahead.

Chris Mills: Hi, all. I just wanted to get a little more clarification on the new ad policy. I was confused whether or not it applies to just new ad buys or, like, an ad that was bought two weeks prior to the election. Would those still be allowed to run? Thanks.

Sarah Schiff: Thanks. In the final week of the campaign, advertisers may continue to run ads about social issues, elections, or politics as long as those as delivered and ran prior to the final week. After the polls close, ads about social issues, elections, or politics in the U.S. will stop running, including those ads that were created before the final week of the campaign.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Sarah. Operator, before we wrap, just a bit of housekeeping. The Newsroom post will be live in a few minutes. I mentioned the two assets that will be linked there that folks should take a look at. Lastly, a transcript of this
call including the Q&A will be posted to the Newsroom as well as soon as possible.

But it probably is going to be a couple hours later this afternoon, if you want to refer back to it. With that, we're going to wrap up. If you have any follow up questions, you can reach us at press@fb.com. This also lifts the embargo. And thanks for joining us today.

Operator: This concludes the Facebook Press Call. Thank you for joining. You may now disconnect your line.

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