FACEBOOK, INC.

Moderator: Tom Reynolds
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OPERATOR: This is Conference #7473008

Operator: Hello, and welcome to today's press call. There will be prepared remarks and a Q&A to follow. To ask a question after the prepared remarks conclude, please press "star," "1." Now I'd like to turn the call over to Tom Reynolds who will kick this off.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Operator. And hey, everybody. Thanks for joining us today. I'm Tom Reynolds from the Facebook Communications Team. You hopefully saw our announcement from earlier this morning about our Voting Information Center rolling out and going live today.

There are a number of interesting components to the new product, so in addition to our newsroom post, we wanted to host this short briefing to add some additional context and thinking about the voting center to discuss in a bit more detail some of the features and how it fits into our broader comprehensive election strategy, and ultimately the value we think it can provide to people during this election season.   We also wanted to give you a chance to ask some questions you might have about the product and our voter registration efforts.

So on the call today we have Naomi Gleit, our V.P. of Product and Social Impact, who will speak to the Voting Information Center product and its specific features, then Nathaniel Gleicher, our Head of Security Policy, will talk about how this effort fits into our broader election integrity efforts that I mentioned.

Also on the call to help with questions is Emily Dalton Smith who is a Product Manager for this initiative as well. Once we get through some opening remarks, we'll be happy to take your questions. Just as a reminder the call is on the record with no embargo. And with that, I will turn it over to Naomi.

Naomi Gleit: Hey, everyone. I'm Naomi Gleit, and I lead the product teams that build tools to help people make a positive impact in their community such as fundraisers as well as connect people to accurate information like the COVID Information Center.

As you know, we're rolling out our new Voting Information Center on both Facebook and Instagram, and I'm really excited about it. The goal of this effort is simple. We want to connect people with accurate information about how to register and vote this fall. I know a lot of you have information about this initiative already, but I wanted to share a bit more thinking on why we are doing this and highlight just a few of the many product features that we're launching.

As Mark wrote in his op-ed in June, we firmly believe that voting is voice. It is the most powerful expression of democracy and the best way to hold our leaders our accountable. And that's why we're working to help four million voters register and given them the tools and information they need to make their voices heard this election season.

This year, the pandemic has already had a profound impact on voting in the U.S. We saw it throughout the primaries and it will likely continue in the general election as well. People are understandably concerned about the impact that a crowded polling place might have on their health and safety, and this has already caused many states to make changes to their voting process by expanding early voting and vote-by-mail options.

With our new Voting Information Center, which is informed by the work we did on the COVID Information Center, we know that we can help millions of people access accurate, reliable information about the election and better place

to participate. Bottom line, we want to help every eligible voter in the U.S. who uses our platform vote this year.

Now about the product, the hub is built to change over time to reflect the most important information that's relevant to people. Right now, that's registering to vote and starting the process to vote by mail.

As we get closer to Election Day, voting by mail will be even more important to people who prefer to stay away from crowded polling places. Early voting will also be an important option for many people depending on the rules in their state. So the Voting Center will have important information about both of these issues.

People will still vote in-person on Election Day. So we'll also provide information for them, like helping them find their polling place.

As I mentioned, a big focus right now is on voter registration. It's the first prompt people see when they get to the Info Center. When someone clicks on it, it will take them off-platform to their state authority's website where they can start the process of registering or check to see if they're registered.

For the states where online registration isn't available, we send people to our non-partisan partner Democracy Works. We're also making it easy for people to share this registration tool with their followers so everyone from a movie star to my dad can help their friends and followers register to vote.

One thing we've heard from state officials is that they're having trouble recruiting people to help staff polling places. Poll workers play an important role in every election, making sure things run smoothly on Election Day and during early voting periods. We're adding a (toll) in the Voting Information Center for people to sign up as a poll worker through their state. We're also offering free ad credits to state election officials in 50 states plus the District of Columbia to help them recruit poll workers.

Since state election officials are responsible for running the elections in their state, we're connecting people on Facebook with announcements, for example, changes to the voting process from verified state and local election authorities.

As we saw during the primaries, COVID forced election officials to make changes to their election. To make sure election officials can quickly reach their constituents with important information, people will be able to see updates from these offices in this section. People can also choose to receive notifications for these alerts by following their pages.

The last piece I want to highlight – but there are many more features in the Voting Center you should check out – is this Facts About Voting tool that's built into the Voting Information Center.

We've partnered with the Bipartisan Policy Center – it's a non-profit organization – to provide a list of eight things to know about elections. These are separate from our fact-checking program, where our 10 fact-checking partners in the U.S. review specific content and we label it.

Starting today, some of the topics include voting by mail, potential timing for election results, how COVID is impacting the election, along with other topics. And we plan to work with the Bipartisan Policy Center to update these facts and articles so they continue to be relevant as we get closer to Election Day.

On a personal note, this has been one of the most important efforts I've been part of here at Facebook. We do know that the next three months will be a sprint and our teams are working really hard on updates to the Voting Information Center that we'll release as we get closer to the next election milestones like early voting, Election Day, election night and the days after. And we'll have more to share on that soon.

I'll now turn it over to Nathaniel.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Thanks, Naomi. My name is Nathaniel Gleicher and I lead our cross-company work to tackle security threats, including Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior. I want to share a brief update on our work to protect the 2020 election and how that fits together with the voting information center we're talking about today.

I'll also described a few threat trends we're see and how we're working to combat them. We have several line of works – lines of work to tackle security threats ahead of this election. First we know that disinformation and misinformation are at their most virulence in an information vacuum. That means that our efforts to find and stop bad actors are most effective when we combine them with ensuring that people can access authentic, accurate information about major civic moments like the global pandemic or voting.

Put simply, getting accurate information to voters is one of the best vaccines against influence operation. The voting information centers are designed to do exactly that.

Second, we promote increased transparency across our platforms to ensure voters know who they're talking to. Earlier this summer we started labeling state controlled media so that people know who's behind the content they see on Facebook. We also block U.S. targeted ads from these publishers. While only a small portion of ads run by state controlled media target the U.S. we're taking the step out of an abundance of caution to provide an extra layer protection for public debate ahead of the November election.

Third, many of you know that we have specific policies to combat foreign interference and domestic coordinated inauthentic behavior or CIB. These are coordinated efforts to corrupt public debate that rely on the central use of fake accounts. This is perhaps some of most public work. Last week we published our latest monthly CIB report that covered nine separate networks we removed from the platform during last month.

More than half of the networks we took down targeted domestic audiences in their own countries including right here in the United States, in Brazil, in Ukraine, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Yemen. We expect to see domestic actors worldwide continue to attempt to use these tactics. And we'll continue to find and remove these campaigns whether foreign or domestic.

Here are some of the threats that we're closing tracking and working to counter in the coming months. First, attempts to suppress voter turnout by

spreading false information about how voting works in the midst of this pandemic. That's why the work that Naomi talked about is so critical. To ensure that people have timely and accurate information right in their newsfeed between now and November is an essential component to protecting the election.

Second, attempts to corrupt public debate during vote counting. We know the pandemic will lead to an increase in absentee and mail-in voting and that this could delay ballot counting. This means we may not know the election result on November 3. Threat actors could use this uncertainty to sow doubt about the election result and fill that information vacuum with misleading information.

Out teams will be working around the clock during this critical period to find and stop anyone using deceptive techniques to manipulate public debate. But Naomi also mentioned that the information (we're going) to share through the voting information center will change over time to be as effective as possible. Starting today that's another way to counter this. We want to make sure people have access to the latest authoritative information about preliminary results on and after election night. We'll have more to share on those additional preparations soon.

Third, hack and leak scenarios. One of the threats we should all be focused on are hack and leak operations where a bad actor steals information and then releases it or a manipulated version of it to influence public debate. Russian actors used this technique in 2016 and a range of actors could try it in 2020. Hack and leak operations often target traditional media seeking coverage to drive their agenda. We're working closely with our partners in industry and we're strategizing with independent researchers on how we can all respond to this threat.

This is a whole society challenge because we know that these actors target traditional media in addition to social media. An important component of our response is to increase security for likely (targets of these hacks), like campaign. That's why we built Facebook Protect. A voluntary program that

campaign and other civic actors can join to increase security around their accounts.

The partnerships that we use to tackle threats like hack and leak operations are critical across our work. We work closely with our industry peers at other tech companies, independent researchers, and government partners to ensure that we're all protecting the election. In part this is because influence operations are rarely limited to a single platform.

We've seen them combine efforts on social media platforms, target traditional both large and small to see their narrative and mislead people. To tackle this whole is a society challenge. The tech industry and U.S. government agencies tasked to protecting the integrity of the election have been regularly meeting since 2018 to discuss election security and how to counter influence operation.

We held the (latest if these) meetings just yesterday. Industry updated on what we're seeing on our respective platform – what we expect to see in the coming months. Our government partners discuss the trends that they're taking.

For example, we discussed preparations for the upcoming conventions and scenario planning related to election results. We will continue to stay vigilant and meet regularly ahead of the November election. We know that the adversaries that we face will continue to improve their tactics and so will we.

These voting information centers are an important example of that ongoing innovation. We're putting clear and accurate information about the election and the electoral process into the hands of voters and that can help inoculate public debate against disinformation and make deceptive campaigns more difficult.

We will continue to evolve our response to stay ahead of our adversaries and ensure the integrity of the U.S. election. And with that, we'd be happy to answer your questions.

Operator: We will now open the line for questions. To ask a question, press "star" followed by the number "1". Your first question comes from Brian Fung from CNN. Please go ahead.

Brian Fung: Hi guys. Thanks for doing the call. Twofer if I may – one, you've seen President Trump take in at mail-in voting and indicate that he may not be open to accepting the result of the election. What is your plan (for if that occurs), and do you think it's enough to give users simply information about how to vote when the President has engaged in a sustain attempt to discredit things like mail-in voting? Thanks.

Nathaniel Gleicher: This is something that we're particularly focused on. In particular because it looks increasingly like we may not have results on election night and as that process moves forward as people – as election officials are counting the mail-in ballots. It's critical to ensure that in that period of uncertainty we can get accurate information out to voters.

Now this is a challenge for all of us, right? I think you guys of the press I'm sure are thinking the same thing. How do you cover claims about voting? How a candidate is doing, or the legitimacy of the election but also make sure that voters have clear context. We want people to understand the debate, but we also want them to understand the facts.

We face a similar challenge and this is an important reason in application for the voting information centers. In (the lead up), they'll show clear information about voting – how to vote, where to vote, the details that Naomi talked about.

For election night and the period after it's not just about how to vote but we're preparing to use them to show similarly clear information about the vote counts and I think really importantly the process; how the process is preceding and what to expect.

It's particularly important that people know not just where the vote is but what's happening, what's going to happen next and if there is a process in place that is working to get to an accurate and fair result.

Now it's important to note, this is just one piece of our strategy for this critical period. We'll have teams working 24/7 to find and stop actors using CIB or deceptive campaigns to exploit that uncertainty. We'll take action against posts from anyone that insight violence or clearly violate our community standards.

And we'll work closely with our partners at other tech companies, state election officials and independent researchers to monitor for emerging threats. For claims about who's winning or losing the results, we'll be showing clear accurate information to voters at the top of their news fed and right along with those posts about how the count is going and what to expect.

So they have that context to put those claims in context and help mitigate this period of uncertainty similar to how the context you'll be providing and feeding into your reporting is going to do the same thing.

Operator:	Your next question comes from (Issie Lapowsky) from (Protocol). Your line is open.

(Issie Lapowsky):	Hi. Yes, thanks for calling on me. This is a related question. Nathaniel, we touched on the meeting yesterday with the government partners and the brands. Can you expand on that a little bit? You said that you talked about preparations for the upcoming convention and scenario planning related to election results. Can you (flesh) some of that out?

Nathaniel Gleicher:	Sure. So these are regular meetings that we have been having between community of tech companies that see the challenge across all of our platforms and government agencies that are focused on protecting the election.

In particular if you think about the Foreign Influence task force at the FBI and the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency both of whom are focused on how do we protect the election and ensure there is public authentic debate heading into it.

What happens in those meetings is that the companies share what we're seeing, trends that we're seeing. For example in the past we've talked about efforts that we've seen to target campaigns.

These are all things that have been talked about publicly but we are discussing as we see these patterns, as we see actors from foreign countries from China, from Russia try to target campaigns. How do we make sure that we an industry are giving them the tools to protect themselves. Like for us that's Facebook Protect. And that government is using all the tools that they have to identify these.

As we get closer and closer to the election, we talk about trends that we are seeing and they talk about trends that they are seeing. The reason we talked about the conventions is as you know critical civic moments like that can often be a magnet for an operation.

And in a time like this where the conventions are going to be different than they've ever been because they will be online we need to think about does that change our posture? Does that create new risks or does that mitigate risks? Those are the types of discussions that we've been having.

Operator: Your next question comes from Kurt Wagner from Bloomberg. Please go ahead.

Kurt Wagner: Hey. Thanks, everyone. Two quick ones, Nathaniel, you mentioned the (hack and leak) operations and kind of fear that that could happen again. I'm curious if you or Facebook has been kicked off of anything that might be (coming) or that you should be on the lookout for specifically.

And second question is, is there any update on the political ad targeting? In the past I think there have been discussions around maybe limiting targeting as we get closer to the Election Day. I'm just curious if any of the policies there are going to be changed or updated as we get closer. Thank you.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Sure, so on your first question, which is about hack and leaks – or hacks and leaks? It's an interesting question for how you would make that plural. We – there's been some public reporting, right, the U.S. government has indicated

publicly that there are actors, for example, in Ukraine that are seeding information and might have links back to Russian actors.

We don't have specific examples beyond the things that have been talked about publicly. What we do know is that this was an effective technique, these actors tried to use it in 2016, and it's something that targets all of society.

Traditional media – often they target traditional media to try to generate amplification for their message and social media to spread it, and so it's something that we've been particularly focused on to make sure we have the tools in place and that the whole community is ready to respond. On the question of political ads, we're still discussing our policy both pre and post election, including political ads. I don't have more details to offer on that at this time.

Operator: So our next question comes from Queenie Wong from CNET. Please go ahead.

Queenie Wong: Thank you for taking the time to answer my question. So my question is about the use of labels. So when social media users see a label, they often assume there is like, something wrong with the content, and labeling is being used, like not only on Facebook, but on Twitter as well, and their labels is different than Facebook's label; and there's been some criticism from the Biden campaign about the label about voting information being under their posts, and Trump sharing what they say is misinformation about mail-in voting and that label appearing under his posts as well.

So what's (your view or response) to this criticism, and is there anything you're doing to sort of make it more clear to users, like this is how you're supposed to read the label. It's not necessarily – it's not about flagging misinformation, it's just about directing you to more voting information?

Nathaniel Gleicher: It's a really good question, and I think what it speaks to is, you have to be very careful as you're developing any approach to misinformation, including labels, to make sure that you're making the situation better and you're not creating more confusion. When we create labels – and there are a lot of

different labels that we use, I mentioned at the – in my intro, the label to put on fake-controlled media, as one example.

There are also labels that go on content that is determined to be false by fact checkers, and then we will have additional context going on posts around voting. So different labels mean different things. For each of them, we don't just come up with a label in a vacuum, I think that's very important.

We do careful testing with users and with the researchers to figure out what will send the clearest message and what will be most effective and helpful for users. A good example of this is actually if you look at how our labels around misinformation have evolved over time. We base those labels on academic research, and there was a period of time where research was showing that you wanted labels shaped in a certain way to be as effective with both – with users, and we followed that research.

And then as that research and as it was clear that you wanted more and more prominent labels, the labels we use have become very prominent and very clear. That's why now for example on video, if a video has been rated false by a fact checker, there's literally an interstitial over the video, that someone has to click through in order to see it, and that decision is based on extensive research and partnership with researchers to make sure that we're being as effective as we can.

Operator: Your next question comes from Joe Henke from 11Alive news, please go ahead.

Joe Henke: Thank you. Two real quick questions. One, the Voter Information Center, what do you see the importance of this tool possibly supplementing or helping out with a lot of community based organizations that aren't able to do either usual voter turnout methods right now because of the pandemic, they cannot be going door-to-door, they can't be at community events, is that what the thought process behind the information center?

And also, how realistic do you see the goal of registering 4 million people to be here in Georgia, that's about the equivalent of how many people voted in the last presidential election, so it's a pretty lofty number?

Emily Dalton Smith: Thanks. Yes, as you mentioned, these efforts are even more important now than in the past. Voting is already complex and different state by state. People may not want to go to the polls due to – due to COVID and the health risks around that. That's why people need accurate information about how to vote.

We surveyed adults in the U.S. and over half said that they believe people will need more information on how to vote this election than in previous elections. We also based our Voting Information Center on lessons from our COVID Information Center. We launched that in March, which gives people information from health authorities about the pandemic and we're applying those same lessons here.

To address your question around 4 million, as you mentioned, we have a very aggressive goal. We want to help 4 million people register to vote. It's a goal, not a forecast. It's very ambitious, but we wanted to aim too high rather than too low.

In 2016 we helped register 2 million voters ahead of the 2016 election and 2 million more for the 2018 mid-term election and this year we want to be even more aggressive and we've been preparing for this for over a year and have already started our voting reminders as early as in January.

So, we're doing everything we can to hit that really aggressive goal.

Operator: Your next question comes from (Julia Jammot) from (AFP). Please go ahead.

(Julia Jammot):   Hi. I was wondering when we get closer to the election, like a month (inaudible) are you considering tightening some rules about (ways to add) for instance or other things related to the election?

Nathaniel Gleicher: Thanks for the question. We're still considering a range of policy responses as we get closer to the election. The – we are still trying to analyze what's going to be most effective and obviously we want to make sure that whatever we do is grounded in what is going to help improve and support public debate as much as possible.

Operator: Your next question comes from (Shirin Ghaffary) from (Recode). Your line is
                      open.

(Shirin Ghaffary): Hi, so back in, I believe, late May or June, Trump made a claim about mail-in
                      voting in California that was widely fact checked as false, saying that all
                      Californians will receive ballots even if they're not registered to vote and this
                      will lead to a rigged election.

                      If Trump were to make a claim – first of all, are you considering applying fact
                      checking to that claim retroactively in light of your increased efforts around
                      spreading correct information on the elections? And if he made a claim like
                      that again, would you fact check it?

                      And I mean, would you apply it – a label to it, that said this is a fact checked
                      post?

Nathaniel Gleicher: This is actually one of the key reasons why, when we're launching the
                      Voting Information Center, it's not just about content being at the top of news
                      feeds, we're actually going to be associating it posts about voting. When an
                      elected official is making a claim about the reliability of voting or the trust we
                      should have in voting, that's very important information for people to have. I
                      think actually that probably contributes to people's decisions as they're
                      thinking about how to vote themselves, but it's also really important that
                      people have the facts.

                      And so, the goal here is on a post like that people should see clear context and
                      a link to information about how voting does work and what the safeguards are
                      and what the controls are that are in place and context about how the process
                      will happen. That allows – that ensures that people can see the post and hear
                      from their elected officials, (warts) and all, but also have accurate context
                      about what the experts are saying.

Operator: Your next question comes from Gilad Edelman from WIRED Magazine.
                      Please go ahead.

Gilad Edelman: Hey, the risk of sounding like a grandpa or Republican congressman, I don't actually see the Voting Information Center on my Facebook, and I'm wondering when we're actually going to be able to play around with it?

Naomi Gleit: Great question. It is rolling out today, so I believe it's in the early stages of rolling out and you'll definitely have it by the end of today.

Operator: Your next questions comes from Katie Paul from Reuters. Please go ahead.

Katie Paul: Hi. Sorry, still laughing at the last question. I have yet another labeling question following up on the others. There was – there's been some discussion of embracing some new labels around newsworthiness, if politicians are saying things that otherwise would (violate policy) but there isn't some application currently for that. I'm curious if you can talk through where that stands? Can we expect to see anything roll out? And could you give some sense of color of the discussion around that?

Nathaniel Gleicher: So we're continuing to talk through policies are labeling changes that we would make heading into the election. One thing that I would say is you have to be very careful in thinking about rolling out labels like this and make sure that the label – we were talking earlier about the important of research behind the label and the impact they'll have.

                   Part of the reason we're being so careful here is we need to make sure that the labels we roll out will actually have the effect we want them to have if we're going to do something new. And so, I don't have more to say about that at this point, but the teams are talking about that internally and trying to figure out what the best step is forward given all the pressures that are currently happening.

Operator: Your next question comes from Steven Overly from Politico. Please go ahead.

Steven Overly: Hi. Thank you. I had two quick questions. The first, you mentioned that the conventions was one of the top (ex) that was discussed with other tech companies and that – and sort of an assessment of what the risks are since they are only digital this year. I wonder what the outcome of that

conversation was. Are you anticipating new or increased risks because of the digital structure? And how will you respond to that?

And then secondly you – we were talking about the uncertainty around Election Day. How are you planning to handle misinformation that might come up in those days in between voting day and when we actually have results? Thanks.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Thanks for the questions. On the conventions piece that was something we talked about. It's an interesting point. Certainly as things move online their profile changes, and there are a range of risks that appear, but those risks often are directly related to the platforms across which these things are going to be shared and making sure that those streams are safe and secure. So of course all the tech platforms are going to be thinking about how to do that protection.

I think one of the key points though is certainty around what will pose the greatest threat, or where the greatest challenge will come is lower this year than it would be in a normal election year because the election is so unusual.

And so part of our conversations with our partners have been not just what do we think will happen, but recognizing that the ability to predict what's going to happen is lower than usual. How do we put in to place the rapid response we need so that when the thing that we didn't predict happens we'll be able to all respond quickly and collectively across the tech sector, with the independent research teams that are focused on this, with the government partners and the state elections officials.

You also mentioned a question about misinformation during this period when we may not have results. So two things, one we sort of said this but I'll say it again. The team is continuing to think about additional steps we want to take during this period. We've done a series of internal (red) teams and exercises to think about challenges that could emerge and to make sure that we're prepared for them.

The Voting Information Center and the accurate information that it's going to provide is a key part of that strategy. And not just putting it at the top of the

feed, but actually linking it in to posts talking about voting. And I should say that in this period after there will be information about posts – we're also talking about how do we provide context on the process itself, on the process of counting?

One of the things we found is that efforts to spread disinformation exploit people's uncertainty about how the process is supposed to work. And so showing people proactive, authoritative information is one of the best ways to counter misinformation, to counter disinformation, and to inoculate public debate against (these threats).

Tom Reynolds: Thanks. Operator, we're going to have time for two more questions for our speakers.

Operator: Thank you. Our next question comes from (Rafael Valaniri) from (News Echo). Please go ahead.

(Rafael Valaniri): Yes, hello. To which extent can you do all of this given that Facebook employees are allowed to work from home until 2021 when we saw the impact on your content moderation work you were not able to moderate as much content as before. So this time for elections, to which extent can technology help you to do all of this? And also could you share a bit what are the trends now that you see those inauthentic behaviors? Is it Russia, is it China? And what are the messages, basically?

Nathaniel Gleicher: Sure. So two separate questions there. The first thing that I would say is sending – making sure that we are protecting our employees and that our employees can do this safely is critical for Facebook and it's a really important priority for us. We had to figure out how we can still do all the critical work even in the reality of this pandemic.

When, as people go home and are working from home one of the things we've really done is focused on better artificial intelligence, better machine learning, and detection platforms so that our automated systems can be more effective.

It's an interesting example, just this week we reported our transparency report and one of the things we noted there is that we are now proactively detecting

more than about 95 percent of the hate speech that we removed from out platforms, our automated systems are proactively detecting and removing.

That's up from 89 percent in the first quarter, and only 24 percent when we started doing these reports. And so, even in the course of the pandemic we've been able to post some pretty significant gains in proactive detection in automated systems to cover that gap.

You were asking about and separately you were asking about tactics. I think one thing we know is that these threat actors constantly change their tactics and are evolving to stay ahead of anything that the defenders do. The good news is what we've seen consistently over the last couple of years is that the defenders, that is that the tech platforms but also in government and independent researchers are getting better faster than the attackers.

We're seeing these operations get caught sooner. We're seeing them caught before they can have as much impact. And so they're trying to do a couple of things. One is rather than running big large massive campaigns with lots and lots of followers, which get caught; they're trying to run smaller more tailored campaigns with smaller groups. Now the problem with running a smaller more quiet campaign so you don't get caught is you're running a smaller more quiet campaign and you don't get noticed and the whole point of this is to get noticed.

And so we're forcing these actors to choose between something loud that gets caught and something quiet that maybe doesn't get to their impact but still gets caught. And we've also seen and particularly here we've seen Russian actors and Iranian actors directly reach out to journalists to try to trick them into doing their amplification for them. So there's been a string of cases where Iranian actors have used false identities to get op eds and letters to the editor published in U.S. newspapers.

It's a good reminder that these operations don't just target social media. They target all of society and we've seen them reach out directly to journalists trying to trick them (into) write stories that aren't true. We saw this around the mid-terms where there is a direct effort to this and to create the impression

that there was secret second (troll farm). At the time the teams were able to come together and get enough accurate information to put that in context. And so those are a couple of the things we're thinking about and expect to see more of in the months to come.

Tom Reynolds: Operator, this is going to be our last question.

Operator: OK. Your last question comes from (Glenn Chapman) from (AFP). Please go ahead.

(Glenn Chapman): Hi, thanks for squeezing me in. Just kind of a summary question. So given that this is a – like you said it's a multi front battle you're fighting on you have to trust your allies and peers in the industries and in a government that has increasingly, including today, raised – been seeming to be, I'll say this, part of the problem when it comes to confusing information about the election.

So how confident are you and kind of why that this teams, your peers in the – parts of the administration you're meeting with are kind of dedicated to and up to the task of defending this election?

Nathaniel Gleicher: There are two different government groups we've coordinated with most closely. First our state election officials from state governments around the country, state secretary of state and state elections officials who might see these threats first. They have been incredibly focused on this challenge and they're especially important early warning system as these things emerge.

And then second is the foreign influence task force at the FBI and the cyber security and infrastructure security agency. And what I can tell you is the people that we work with, the teams that I've worked with have been dedicated and focused on protecting the election. On ensuring that it is authentic and defending the infrastructure itself.

What I can speak to is the work of this team and this team has been – was the core team that came together around the mid-terms and protected the mid-terms. And government actors but also the teams at all the different

companies, at all the tech companies and independent researchers have worked very closely and very effectively together to make sure that we're defending public debate as effective as possible.

Tom Reynolds: Operator, I think we're going to wrap up there. Thanks everybody for joining. Just quickly to note for your reporting, the transcript of this call, including the open remarks and the Q&A session will be posted to the Facebook newsroom ASAP. Additionally, if you have any follow up questions, feel free to e-mail us at press@fb.com and we're happy to follow-up (with you).

Thanks again for joining us and we'll talk to you soon.

Operator: This concludes the Facebook Press Call. Thank you for joining. You may now disconnect your line.

END