OPERATOR: This is Conference #: 7378830

Operator: Hello and welcome to today’s Facebook press call. There will be prepared remarks and a Q&A to follow. To ask a question after the prepared remarks conclude, please press “star” and “1.” Now, I would like to turn the call over to Tom Reynolds who will kick this off.

Tom Reynolds: Great. Thanks, Operator, and thanks everybody for joining the call today. This is Tom Reynolds from the Facebook Communications Team. We’re just over a year away from the U.S. 2020 elections and we wanted to share an update on the efforts we’ve taken over the past three years to increase our election preparedness. We’re also planning to share some new initiatives we’re rolling out.

Joining us on the call today is Mark Zuckerberg, Founder and CEO of Facebook, and Nathaniel Gleicher, Head of Facebook’s Cyber Security Policy. They’ll take you through our preparations heading into 2020 as well as detail some of the announcements we’re making.

In the room here is also Guy Rosen, Vice President of Integrity Work; Katie Harbath, Public Policy Director for Global Elections; and Rob Leathern, Director of Product Management for Business Integrity. They’re available to help answer any questions in more specific detail and can dive a little deeper into any of those specific topics.
Finally, the call is on the record and with no embargo. With that, let me turn it over to Mark.

Mark Zuckerberg: All right, thanks. Hey, everyone. Thanks for joining today. We’re almost a year out from the 2020 U.S. election, so I wanted to share some of the updates on our elections integrity work, including some of the threats we’re seeing, what we’re doing to improve transparency to stop foreign interference in our public debates, and to combat voter suppression.

So the bottom line here is that elections have changed significantly since 2016 and Facebook has changed, too. We’ve gone from being on our back foot to now proactively going after some of the biggest threats that are out there. We built systems to fight interference that we believe are more advanced than what any other company is doing and most governments.

We face increasingly sophisticated attacks from nation states like Russia, Iran, and China, but I’m confident that we’re more prepared now because we’ve played a role in defending against election interference in more than 200 elections around the world since 2016, including the French Presidential Election, the German Federal Election, the U.S. Midterms and Mexico and India, and the E.U, and we see much cleaner results.

After the recent E.U. elections, the President of the E.U. Parliament said that we had respected commitments that we made to the European Parliament to prevent non-European influences to alter the vote of E.U. citizens.

All right, so we’ve seen three strategies in particular work well. The first is to build A.I. systems and teams of expert investigators that can identify clusters of fake accounts and groups and pages that are – that are often using fake accounts to conceal who’s behind them and can be attempting to spread misinformation or to amplify each other to make it appear that what they’re saying has more supporter consensus than it does.

We call this coordinated inauthentic behavior, and we’ve identified and removed more than 50 such clusters of these fake accounts in the last year. The initial clusters that we saw were primarily from Russia, and more recently we have seen increasing sophistication and attacks emanating from Iran and
China as well some companies that are now out there selling services for this kind of deception.

When I’m done speaking here today, Nathaniel Gleicher, our Director of Cyber Security Policy, is going to discuss four networks that we’re taking offline today out of Russia and Iran. Now, needless to say the existence of this activity shows that actors in these nations are continuing to attempt to interfere in elections and public debate around the world, and including in the U.S. But the fact that we've identified them proactively (should) provide some confidence that our systems here are working.

We've also seen an increased prevalence of domestic coordinated inauthentic behavior around the world, which (you know) – the same types of clusters of fake accounts, but run by people in the same country that they're targeting rather than foreign interference.

And identifying this is hard work, and our team working on this includes people from the intelligence community, from law enforcement, and investigative journalists. Those who have followed our work closely probably know that we now have more than 35,000 people working on safety and security, and that our overall security budget is now billions of dollars a year, greater than the whole revenue of our company was when we went public earlier this decade.

The second strategy that has worked well to stop this kind of election interference is focused on verification and transparency. Since 2016, you know, we changed our systems to now require verification, providing a valid government ID and proving your location in order to run political ads or run a large page.

We've also made Facebook ads more transparent than any other type of advertising that is out there. All political and issue ads are now put into an archive so they can be scrutinized by everyone for years to come, and this is something that no TV or print does. You can see all the ads that a candidate or an organization are running, including how much they spent and who was shown the ad.
And as a result of this new level of transparency, we're seeing journalists and researchers now able to scrutinize political advertising in ways that weren't even possible a few years back.

To double down on this transparency, we're announcing a few improvements to our services today. The first is we're going to show much more prominent labels on content that independent fact checkers have marked as false.

We already show labels today, but the new labels will increase transparency of the fact check and ensure that anyone who comes across fact checked content will see that it has been fact checked and marked false before tapping through to see the content. We're also introducing clearer labeling for fact checked content on Instagram too.

The second thing we're doing is we're going to label content coming from state-sponsored media. In the U.S., we have the benefit of a free press here, and because of that we think it's especially important to call out transparently when media coming from any country around the world is acting as an organ of the government and not a free press. So we're going to label them prominently.

The third thing we're going to do is we're going to display clearly on pages what country the page is operated from and the legal name of the person or organization that is operating the page. People are still going to be able to post and follow the content that they want, but for example if a page is about a domestic policy issue, people are now going to be able to see a prominent label that it's coming from another country.

The fourth thing that we're doing is we're also introducing a presidential spending tracker, so it will be easier to keep track of the activity of the different presidential candidates across our platforms. So now in addition to identifying clusters of these fake accounts and increasing verification and transparency, this last strategy that I'm going to talk about has also been establishing closer partnerships across government and industry.
Since 2016, we've worked to build relationships with law enforcement and election commissions around the world, as well as with (the other) major platforms in our industry.

And these partnerships have been critical, so when one of us sees some suspicious activity, we can share that signal with the others and all talk action. These partnerships are now significantly stronger than they were in 2016.

Some of you may remember that, last year, two days before the midterms, the FBI shared information with us that allowed us to do a thorough investigation and take down more than 100 accounts that had potential links to Russia’s IRA.

Last month, we also hosted a group of technology companies and key staff from U.S. government agencies at our headquarters to advance planning and coordination as we head into the election cycle in the next year.

So these are the strategies that have been most effective to date and how we’re evolving them. Beyond these, we are also very focused on preventing voter suppression on our platforms.

Last year, we changed our policies, so we now take down any content that is misleading about when to vote or how to vote, like saying that you can vote by text, which, of course, you can’t do, or saying that voting is on Thursday, when, of course, it’s actually on Tuesday.

So we’re going to build on this further for 2020, with new policies to further prevent the spread of inaccurate voting information. We’re also now also going to ban paid advertising that suggests that voting is useless or advises people not to vote at all.

So overall, and this isn’t an exhaustive list of all the things that we have underway, and I’m sure you’ll understand that we can’t describe all of the specific tactics that we’re going to use for security on a public call, but I hope that this gives a sense of the progress that we’ve made over the past few years.
There’s still, of course, a long way to go before Election Day, and we know that we have a big responsibility to secure our platforms and stay ahead of some of these sophisticated new threats to the integrity of elections here and around the world.

Personally, this is one of my top priorities for the company, and as I’ve said at the start of this call, elections have changed significantly, and Facebook has changed, too. We are confident that we are more prepared, heading into 2020, to fight interference and protect the integrity and protect the integrity of our elections.

And now, I’m going to hand it over to Nathaniel Gleicher to discuss the networks that we’ve indentified and we’ll be taking down today.

Nathaniel Gleicher: Building on what Mark said, my team coordinates efforts across our apps to find and stop what we call “information operations,” any coordinated campaign that seeks to manipulate or corrupt public debate.

We also conduct regular Red Team exercises, both internally and with external partners, to identify and prepare for new and emerging threats. We’ll talk about some of the products of these efforts today.

Over the last year, our investigative teams, working together with partners in civil society, law enforcement and industry, have found and stopped more than 50 manipulation campaigns around the world.

As part of this ongoing work, this morning, we removed four separate networks of accounts, pages and groups from Facebook and Instagram – three of them originated in Iran and one in Russia.

They targeted a number of different regions, including the United States, North Africa, and Latin America. We identified these manipulation campaigns as part of our ongoing proactive internal investigations.

The Iranian operations were relatively small and exhibited links to previous operations we’ve removed. They frequently repurposed Iranian state media
content and tailored their content for particular countries they targeted around the world.

The Russia operation showed some links to the internet research agency and had the hallmarks of a well resourced operation. They took consistent operational security steps to conceal their identity and location. And it appears that this operation was still in the early stages and was focused on trying to build its audience when we took it down.

As always with these takedowns, we’re removing these operations for the deceptive behavior they engaged in, not for the content they shared. We’ve shared information about our findings with law enforcement and industry partners and we will continue working with others to find and remove this behavior.

We’ve also shared information with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Laboratory and Graphika so that they can conduct external content analyses of these networks.

As we’ve improved our ability to disrupt these operations, we’ve also deepened our understanding of the types of threats that are out there and how best to counter then. The best way to address someone boosting the popularity of their post in their own country or pushing political clickbait may differ from the best way to counter foreign interference.

And so today we’re updating our inauthentic behavior policy to clarify how we enforce against the spectrum of deceptive practices we see on our platforms, whether foreign or domestic, state or non state.

The investigations we’ve announced today are critical. But in addition to taking down each network, we also work to isolate any new behaviors we see these networks engaged in and then work to automate the detection of them at scale.

This slows down the bad guys and lets our investigators focus on improving our defenses against emerging threats. Because information operations often
target multiple platforms as well as traditional media, we collaborate closely with partners in industry, civil society, and government.

We also are continually building in increased transparency on our platform so that the public, along with open source researchers and journalists, can find and expose more bad behavior themselves.

Finally, specific to the upcoming 2020 election, we are launching a new program called Facebook protect to further secure candidates, campaign staff, and others who may be frequent targets of hacking from foreign adversaries. These are just a few of the ways we’re improving our investigative team, building out our scaled enforcement and providing increased transparency across our platform.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Mark. Operator, we can turn it over for Q&A.

Operator: Certainly. We will now open the line for questions. Please limit yourself to one question per person. To ask a question, press “star” followed by the number “1.” Your first question comes from Mike Isaac with The New York Times. Your line is open.

Mike Isaac: Hey, guys, thanks for doing the call. This is, I guess, a question for Mark or Nathaniel, whoever. I just want to know how the progress you all have had with cooperating with both domestic and foreign governments has (dawned) since this – you all have started this initiative.

I know initially there was not exactly great participation between at least us and the U.S. government. And so I’m wondering how that’s gone and then as well as company sort of cooperation beyond just Facebook, like how you’re dealing with the many different sites that this sort of works across. Thanks.

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure. Thanks, Mike. Yes, I’ll answer at a high level and then Nathaniel can get into more of the details. Since 2016, the partnerships broadly have gotten a lot stronger. And I think what we’ve seen is that after 2016 there’s just much broader awareness that this is an issue.
So, agencies – whether it’s the FBI or other law enforcement – certainly want to make sure now we have – we have much better relationships and information sharing because I think there’s awareness of the threats that are out there and that this is something that will require both the public and private sector working together.

It’s actually probably worth noting that in the Senate Intelligence Committee report that came out last week, one of the conclusions was that these threats will require continued partnership between the public sector and private sector.

I’d say a similar thing between the internet companies, I think we generally have pretty good signal sharing on threats, whether it’s election related threats or, you know, the work that we’re doing to counterterrorism or child exploitation.

Those areas where there’s pretty good partnership and collaboration, and I just think that as people have more awareness of the threats then it’s clear that everyone needs to work together.

Nathaniel, I don’t know if there’s anything more detailed that you want to add on this?

Nathaniel Gleicher: The only thing that I would, I think there has been pretty significant improvement, and one of things we see is how determined the teams in government, in civil society, and in industry all are to tackle this problem, and work together as effectively as possible.

There’s a couple of really good indicators of this, over the past six months or so, there’ve been a number times when either we’ve found a network, been able to take action against it, share that information with our partners in the industry and they’ve been able to take action as well, or the reverse.

So if you look at the takedowns around the – around Hong Kong, Twitter actually warned us about some activity that they saw on their platform and we used that to take our own action. And then we’ve had a number of cases
involving activity coming from Iran where we’ve been able to warn Twitter, in that case.

And as far as government goes, we did recently host this roundtable where we had the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence along with us, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter, all together talking about how we can work together most effectively heading into 2020.

Tom Reynolds: Next question?

Operator: Your next – certainly, your next question is from Julia Boorstin with CNBC, your line is open.

Julia Boorstin: (Inaudible) the effort to manipulate coming from various countries, if there are any more dramatic steps that you’re considering to just limit political advertising in general?

You’ve talked about the importance of free speech, but also are balancing sort of the dramatic measures you have to take to educate people around political and issue-based advertising. So how are you thinking about potential next steps to sort of potentially curtail issue-based and political advertising? And I’d love it if Mark had an answer there.

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure. So, you know the beginning of your question was a little bit cut off, so forgive me if I – if I’m missing some important context, but I think I got what you’re asking about.

The most important things we’re doing on political advertising to prevent foreign interference are the programs around verification and transparency. So, for verification we now require people who are running political ads or organizations to be able to provide a valid government ID and to prove their location.

So that would, of course, prevent someone based in Russia – just for an example, based on what we saw in 2016 – from buying an ad in U.S. elections
or in other elections around the world where the laws would require that person to be domestic in order to advertise – participating in the election.

But our work actually goes beyond that because I don’t think the laws prevent people from outside the country participating in issue ads, but we would prevent that. The transparency work also helps increase the scrutiny here. Because now unlike any other type of advertising that’s out there, you know, through an election cycle there will be millions of ads that are run across all media.

And now there’s an archive of all of the political and issue ads, right, so even things that are not directly related to a candidate or an election that will be visible to everyone for years so journalists and researchers can scrutinize them, and that is bringing a new level of transparency, which is highlighting some sketchy things that people are doing that are on the margins and may technically be allowed by some policies but I think most of us would agree would be bad practices.

So those are probably the biggest parts of this and what we’re doing. And other than that, on political ads overall, you’re right that it certainly has been a source of controversy for this. I spoke about this at some length in my speech last week on why I think it’s important to give people a voice and to protect free expression.

You know, from a business perspective, it certainly is not – this controversy is not worth the very small part of our business that this makes up. So you know, this isn’t about money.

It’s that – I believe that giving people a voice is important and ads can be an important part of voice, especially for – you know, in the political system, if you’re a challenger candidate or an advocacy group that might not otherwise be covered by the media, ads are an important way to be able to get your message out in front of some people.

And you know, and what I’ve seen is that banning political ads would favor incumbents and whoever the media decided to cover most, and I don’t think
that that’s what we want to do either. So I’m happy to talk about this in more
detail but at a high level, those are my views.

Tom Reynolds: (Inaudible) the announcement (for today).

Nathaniel Gleicher: Absolutely. I think on the transparency front, we’ve been listening to feedback from a variety of stakeholders, including the media regulators, and watchdog groups. And so we’re adding a lot of additional features. One of the things we’ve heard is, you know, people want the ability to look at these campaigns at scale, so we’ve been working to make a lot of changes to the API.

And so what we’re announcing today as well is the ability to programatically download all the (ad creative). We’ve also heard that folks want help in analyzing this or having scripts to be able to do so, so we’re making that easier for people to access, and we’re also providing various other elements that allow folks to track this more over time.

So for example, unique IDs for each ad that people can see, both in the API and the ad library, and then also making the updates daily. So I think there’s a lot of great features we’re adding to make it easier to analyze and see the kinds of messages that people are putting into political ads.

Tom Reynolds: Great. Operator, we can take next question.

Operator: Our next question is from Tony Romm with “Washington Post.” Your line is open.

Tony Romm: Hey, everybody, thanks for taking my question. This is for both Mark and Nathaniel. You know, you had mentioned at the outset of the call that you guys are doing more work on the issue of domestic misinformation, and that that’s become a challenge for you all. Can you first talk a little bit about that? And second, have you seen instances of domestic misinformation here in the United States that you’ve taken action against? Thanks.

Mark Zuckerberg: I’ll let Nathaniel speak to the specifics around this, but I mentioned that primarily as a trend that we’re seeing around the world. Right? Part of why
what we have increased confidence about our preparedness leading into the
2020 U.S. elections is because we have now played a role in defending against
foreign interference or domestic interference – in almost every major election
around the world since then, including elections where we have seen domestic
groups, in some cases even the political parties themselves spin up efforts to –
I’m not referring to the U.S. here – spin up efforts to large coordinated
inauthentic efforts that we’ve basically had to – had to identify and track
down and take down.

Nathaniel, you can speak more specifically to what we’ve seen in the U.S.
here.

Nathaniel Gleicher: So the thing that – what I would add is that there’s an important distinction
embedded here. Certainly if we see content that is false, that has been
reviewed by a third-party fact checker, there are actions that we take based on
that review by the third-party fact checker, but here when we’re talking about
information operations, what we’re primarily talking about is deceptive
behavior.

So with actors that are concealing their identity, that are using fake accounts,
that are using other techniques to make their content appear more popular than
it is. And here we’re taking action not on the content itself, but on the
behavior.

Around the world when we look at information operations, a lot of it is
domestic in nature because if you want to manipulate or influence a public
debate, you have to understand the public debate and then you have to have
access to it. And there are always more people who have both of those
characteristics inside a country than outside of it.

We have taken action on one network here in the U.S. that was a domestic
network that involved the Alabama special election. We announced that and
talked about that back when that happened.

If you look on our Newsroom post, you can see for each and every one of
these operations we announce it publically, provide details and content
samples, and you can see those there on the website that details all the different operations (we’ve actioned) that have been domestic around the world.

Tom Reynolds: Operator, we can take the next question.

Operator: Your next question is from Donie O’Sullivan with CNN. Your line is open.

Donie O’Sullivan: Hey. My question is for Mark. Mark, last week Bernice King, the daughter of Martin Luther King, took issue with you mentioning her father in her speech about free expression in Washington. King said that disinformation, like that on Facebook today, is what created an atmosphere for her father’s assassination. What is your response to Bernice King?

Mark Zuckerberg: Thanks for the – for the question. I appreciate Dr. King reaching out. I’ve actually reached out to talk to her directly about this, and I think she’s going to be at Facebook later this week to talk about this, but I will miss her this week as I will be in D.C. testifying.

But overall, look, Martin Luther King Jr. is an American hero, and his assassination is clearly a major national tragedy. And I think she’s right that these issues around hate and disinformation likely played a role in the environment around his assassination, and those are big issues and that’s why we work hard to fight them in everything that we do.

At the same time, one of the things that I find inspiring is that through everything that Martin Luther King Jr. went through, he never lost faith in the importance of free expression. And part of what I tried to lay out in my speech last week is that I think that there are multiple equities and values at play here where we often – every week there’s a new content issue where we’re debating whether it’s harmful and how to deal with it.

And I just think we need to not lose fact of the – not lose sight of the fact that it’s also important to protect people’s voice and free expression. These are competing values at times, and if you only ever focus on the downside or the risk of certain things, then you’re naturally, over time, going to restrict things maybe more than would be ideal and best.
So that's how I think about these issues. I certainly welcome the dialogue—or, I think a lot of what she's saying is right. We're going to continue working hard on fighting against hate and misinformation, and at the same time I think it's very important that we continue to fight for a voice and free expression too.

Tom Reynolds: (Inaudible) (question).

Operator: Our next question is from Deepa Seetharaman with The Wall Street Journal. Your line is open.

Deepa Seetharaman: Hey, can you hear me? OK, I have a question about the voter suppression rule. What happens if a candidate running for office were to purchase an ad like that? In that particular situation, do the political speech rules win out, or does the voter suppression policy win? How would you guys handle that hypothetical? Thanks.

Mark Zuckerberg: I can answer this, and Katie, who's on the call, can jump in if there's details that I miss. The voter suppression rules are—would be paramount in that case, and I actually laid this out in my speech last week, saying that I thought that—you know, in general, in a democracy, it is not right for a private company to censor politicians or the news, but of course there have to be exceptions when there is overwhelming risk.

And the examples that I cited last week were if a politician is calling for violence or inciting violence, if there is a risk of imminent physical harm, and of course voter suppression, which is calling to remove other people's voice.

So that's how we would apply those policies. Katie, I don't know if you want to add anything there?

Katie Harbath: No, I think you covered most of it. That's been part of our efforts since 2016 to update our voter suppression policies. Also (encountered) talking to many external partners, including our civil rights—civil rights groups.
Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Operator. Next question, please?

Operator: Our next question is from Alex Kantrowitz with Buzzfeed. Your line is open.

Alex Kantrowitz: Hey, Mark and team, thanks for taking my question. I just have a question about misinformation and politicians. So if politicians can run ads (inaudible) by fact checkers, how will Facebook react if someone runs for office and then uses their campaign as a shield in order to basically run whatever they want?

Mark Zuckerberg: Sorry, I'm not sure I understood that.

Alex Kantrowitz: I guess – I mean, just to clarify, I'm more – (really) curious about how does Facebook define a politician? So can anyone just start running for their local school board and then start running ads with misinformation in them?

Mark Zuckerberg: All right, Katie, do you want to jump in on the policy here?

Katie Harbath: Yes, no, I'm happy – I'm happy to jump in here. So when we look at defining a politician, we are looking at a couple of different things, particularly, you know, at the federal level, they have to register at the Federal Election Commission and also at the state and local level they do have to register in order to do that, and then we will be updating, you know, and looking at if that should change, did they stop running for office.

And so this applies to currently elected officials, as well as the – that are running for office.

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure, and I mean certainly the policy has an intent behind it, and if we start to see a lot of people trying to circumvent the intent, then we'll figure out how to evolve that in order to make sure that this is doing what we intend.

Tom Reynolds: Operator, for next question please?

Operator: Our next question is from Josh Constine with TechCrunch. Your line is open.

Josh Constine: Hi. So in your speech recently, Mark, you said removing political ads would benefit incumbents. So we’ve seen that often it’s the most powerful candidates that are spending the most on these ads.
You’ve said that you want to give everyone a voice but why doesn’t allowing political ads give more weight to richer voices. I mean can’t you provide freedom of speech where the public can judge candidate statements without unfettered freedom of paid reach?

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure. So I don’t know that there’s – if there’s ever been a full exhaustive study of this, but in general from talking to a lot of people about this – I mean this issue didn’t come up in just the last few weeks, I mean this is something I’ve been thinking about for years about what our policy should be at different points when there have been different issues.

And I’ve talked to a lot of people. The general belief that people have is that when they’re a challenger that they rely on different mechanisms like ads in order to get their voice into a debate more than – more than incumbents do. Then you may be right that incumbents can raise more money.

I’m not sure if it always works that way. But I think that they also have other levers for getting their voice out there and being paid more attention to because they’re already in a position of power, unlike the challengers.

So from all of the conversations that I’ve had, the general overwhelming consensus from people who are participating in these things and who work on them has been that removing political ads would favor incumbents.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Operator. Next question, please.

Operator: Our next question is from Shannon Bond with NPR. Your line is open.

Shannon Bond: Hi. (As following up) on Deepa’s question about the voter suppression rule outweighing the more general policy about political ads, I mean you talked – you talked about other circumstances in terms of where the content of ads would outweigh that general path (kind of been given) to politicians.

But can you – can you think of other exceptions? I mean so voter suppression is clearly another area where that would come up. Are there other things that
are on the radar or where you might reconsider how – whether or not you would let a politician run an ad?

Mark Zuckerberg: So yes, the policy debate recently that we’ve had has largely been about ads with false content in them. There are other policies that we have that around hate speech or different things where there we would have to make a judgment, which is we generally give (deference) to the newsworthiness of content.

If it’s part of the public discourse, we want people to be able to see it. But that’s a judgment, right, that we make when these – when these things conflict. That – that’s the approach overall. I do think that the – it’s also worth noting, I think a lot of people took the – this update that we – that we made as if it was some kind of big departure from our existing policy.

This is actually meant to clarify the way we’ve been operating for some time now. It’s – in general we give very broad deference to political speech. We believe that in a democracy people should be able to see for themselves what politicians are saying.

We don’t do this to help politicians. That’s not the point. The point is that in the democracy we think that people need to be able to see this content. So there is broad deference for that but it’s not everything.

Right. It’s – there’s news worthiness is an important point and of course we just are very careful about how we get involved in asserting the truth of different things. Now there’s one last point that I want to make, which is I know that Facebook has been at the center of a lot of these debates, but I do think it’s important to call out that our policies are broadly in line with what the other major internet companies do and a lot of TV folks.

So my understanding is Google and YouTube and Twitter have broadly similar policies, have run the ads that have been controversial, that we’ve been asked about. They’ve run them as well, as have NBC and ABC and CBS and Fox, and I think MSNBC may have run it.
So I think that this is – this is a broad-based thing and is really not a policy area where we are an outlier.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Operator. We can take the next question, please.

Operator: Our next question is from Maureen Naylor with KTVU. Your line is open.

Maureen Naylor: Hi. Thanks for taking my call. My question for you is how confident are you that these changes that you’ve made since 2016 will address the election interference on your platforms going into 2020? And what is the biggest challenge that you still face to address it?

Mark Zuckerberg: So overall, I’m confident that we’re a lot more prepared. I also know for a fact that more nation states now are also more sophisticated in their attacks, and they’re certainly attempting to continue doing this.

So I know that we’re going to continue to face the threats. We will actually, probably face more threats now than we faced in 2016, given that this has gotten so much attention since 2016. And in general, the systems are just vastly more sophisticated, and we’re in a much better place in dealing with this.

But this isn’t an area where we can take our eye off the ball or that you ever fully solve the problem. And I’ve referred to this as an arms race in the past. I think that that is probably the right analogy. We’re getting better; they’re getting better. I think, right now, we’re doing quite well, but this is certainly an area where we all need to be focused on this.

Nathaniel, is there anything that you wanted to add?

Nathaniel Gleicher: I think I would say you have two guarantees in this space. The first guarantee is that the bad guys are going to keep trying to do this. The second guarantee is that as us and our partners in civil society and our as partners in industry continue to work together on this, we’re making it harder and harder and harder for them to do this.
And that’s what we’ve seen. There’s a reason that we run Red Team exercises, both internally and with external partners, to think through what are the new threats that are coming down the pike and how do we get ahead of them.

Our goal isn’t just to take these things down; it’s that, over time, we can adjust and make changes, targeted changes, to the platform to make these behaviors much more difficult, to make the platform better for authenticity and more resistant to deception.

And one really good indicator of this is if you look at the takedown we announced today, the Russia – the Russian operation, it is fairly early in their operational cycle. They’re still trying to build their audience, and they put a bunch of effort into concealing who they were and hiding and having very good operational security.

But we were able to find them and stop them before they could complete their operation, really as they were just getting going. That’s the goal, and that’s what we’re seeing as everyone across the community comes together to work on it.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Operator. We can take the next question.

Operator: Our next question is from Hannah Murphy with “Financial Times.” Your line is open.

Hannah Murphy: Hi. Can you give a bit more detail on how you fashion this definition of state-controlled media in this new labeling system and whether you expect any of those definitions to be challenged or (something controversial)?

Nathaniel Gleicher: Sure. So we’re defining state-controlled media as any media entity that is under the editorial control of a state. In determining editorial control, we look to a range of factors, including but not limited to the funding, the structure of the organization or open-source reporting of it.
And importantly, we’re distinguishing this from public media entities, which is any media entity that is publically financed, retains a public service mission, and can demonstrate its independent editorial control.

Tom Reynolds: Operator, next question.

Operator: Our next question is from Paris Martineau with WIRED. Your line is open.

Paris Martineau: Hey. I wanted to ask, what is the status of the Social Science One study of political ads on Facebook? It had been reported that Facebook isn’t going to be able to give you guys—or them—the information that they need. And this is just a question for either of you.

Guy Rosen: Hey, this is Guy. Thanks for the question. So we have shared some data to researchers as part of Social Science One including more than 32 million individual links, so this is actually one of the largest private datasets that has been created for academic research on this really important topic.

This is something we’re going to continue to work on to make more data available, while very importantly, making sure we do so in a way that really protects the privacy of the people who use our services.

Tom Reynolds: Great. Thanks, Guy. Operator, we can take the next question.

Operator: Our next question is from Ed O’Keefe with CBS News. Your line is open.

Ed O'Keefe: Thanks for taking the questions, and most of the other things I’d ask have been asked, so let me ask this. Mark, your colleagues confirmed today you’ve privately recommended several potential hires to Pete Buttigieg’s presidential campaign. I’m just curious why you did that, have you done it to other candidates, or does this signal perhaps that you support the mayor’s presidential bid?

Mark Zuckerberg: All right, thanks for the question. No. Look, this shouldn’t be taken as an endorsement. We have several mutual friends from college who introduced me to Pete a number of years ago. I did a Facebook live event a couple of years back. So it’s kind of widely known that I’ve met him.
And when a number of colleagues who I’d worked with at Facebook or my philanthropic foundation were interested in working there, they asked me or my wife, Priscilla, to send over their resume. And so, I did that. I think that this probably should not be misconstrued as if I’m like so deeply involved in trying to support their campaign or something like that.

Tom Reynolds: Thanks, Mark. Operator, we’re going to have time for one more question, please.

Operator: Our last question is from Fergal Gallagher with ABC News. Your line is open.

Fergal Gallagher: Hi, thanks for answering my question. You’ve talked about transparency, and that’s great. And I know you’ve touched on it as well and said you don’t want to be arbiters of truth, but I guess my question is, as illustrated by Elizabeth Warren last week, when you know something definitively to be false, how do you justify still publishing that out?

Mark Zuckerberg: Well, look, I just think that in a democracy people should be able to see for themselves what politicians are saying, and I think that people should make up their own minds about which candidates are credible and which candidates have the kind of character that they want to see in their elected officials. And I don’t think those determinations should come from tech companies.

So that means that people need to be able to see this content themselves. Political speech is probably the most scrutinized speech that there is in the world, and we’re certainly doing our part to increase the transparency around that with the political ads archives that we build to make it possible for journalists and researchers to take an even deeper level of scrutiny to all the content that’s going on online.

I think that that’s the right way to deal with these issues, not to stop people from seeing the content in the first place.

Tom Reynolds: Great, with that, Operator, we’re going to wrap up. Just two points before we close. One, for any follow-up, you can email us at press@fb.com and then
two, we will have a transcript of the call up – posted online ASAP this afternoon, so thanks very much for joining us today.

Operator: This concludes the Facebook press call. Thank you for joining and you may now disconnect your line.

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